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Along with the reduction in transportation costs in the last two centuries, institu-
tional trade barriers have become increasingly important obstacles to furthermarket in-
tegration. In Chapter 1, I examine the impact of a policy reform in China that removed
inter-regional administrative trade barriers by incorporating counties into prefectures
with a larger market. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compare incorpo-
rated counties, both before and after the reform, to two novel control groups: counties
that applied for incorporation but failed and counties that were incorporated several
years later. I find that the reform immediately and persistently increased the economic
growth of incorporated counties. Several sources of evidence suggest that treated coun-
ties experienced relatively rapid growth because they became more integrated into the
domestic market. In Chapter 2, using data from the one-child policy in China (OCP),
Yiming Liu and I provide first field evidence for responsibility-shifting through delega-
tion. We compare the impact of the OCP on parents who experienced it during Phase I
when local governments were the enforcer, versus Phase II when the enforcement was
delegated to civiliansby incentivizing themto report neighbors’ violations. Wefind, con-
sistentwith responsibility-shifting, exposure to theOCP in Phase I reduces people’s trust
in local governments, but exposure to it in Phase II only reduces people’s trust in neigh-
bors, not their trust in local governments. In chapter 3, George Loewenstein, Yiming Liu
and I designed an online experiment to investigate correspondence bias - when draw-
ing inferences about a person’s enduring characteristics fromher actions, people tend to
overly emphasize the role of theperson’s enduring characteristics andunderestimate the
influence of transient situational factors. We build a simplemodel to formalize this bias
and test the predictions of the model. We find evidence of the existence of correspon-
dence bias. Moreover, we show experiencing the games by oneself instead of observing
it reduces the bias, and providing counterfactual information on how the benign-game
iv
(malign-game) player behaves in themalign-game (benign-game) eliminates it.
Keywords: Market integration, Local protectionism, Delegation, Responsibility-
shifting, Correspondence bias.
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1.0 Administrative Barriers, Market Integration and Economic Growth: Evidence
fromChina
Along with the reduction in transportation costs in the last two centuries, institu-
tional trade barriers have become increasingly important obstacles to further market
integration. This paper examines the impact of a policy reform in China that removed
inter-regional administrative trade barriers by incorporating counties into prefectures
with a larger market. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compare incorpo-
rated counties, both before and after the reform, to two novel control groups: counties
that applied for incorporation but failed and counties that were incorporated several
years later. I find that the reform immediately and persistently increased the economic
growth of incorporated counties. Several sources of evidence suggest that treated coun-
ties experienced relatively rapid growth because they became more integrated into the
domestic market. First, using an indirect measure of protection, I find that the reform
significantly reduced local protectionism between incorporated counties and their cor-
responding prefectures. Second, market shares of more productive sectors increased in
treated counties following the reform. Third, firms producing tradable goods rapidly en-
tered treated counties. Finally, less profitable firms in treated counties were more likely
to exit.
1.1 Introduction
The last two centuries have witnessed an unprecedented increase in trade volumes
both between and within nations. Thanks to technological advancements, trade barri-
ers in the form of transportation costs have substantially reduced, contributing to eco-
nomic growth in both developed and developing counties (e.g. Faber, 2014; Donaldson
and Hornbeck, 2016; Storeygard, 2016; Donaldson, 2018). However, institutional trade
barriers (e.g., local protectionism) still widely exist, which strongly limit further mar-
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ket integration. The election of Donald Trump, Brexit, etc., even mark the rising sup-
port for protectionism. Moreover, protectionism not only exists at a national level, but
also between localities. Local governments tend to shield local firms from competition,
across different regimes. For example, Eyer andKahn (2017) document that coal states in
theU.S. provide large financial incentives to encourage power plants to purchase locally
mined coal. While in China, local governments impose a variety of interregional barri-
ers to trade. They provide subsidies to encourage local purchases, make regulations that
discriminate against non-local firms, restrict cross-regional trade, and favor local sup-
pliers in procurement to protect firms within their jurisdiction (Young, 2000; Barwick et
al., 2017). In this paper, I address the following questions: does the local economy grow
faster if local protectionism is eliminated? If yes, what are the underlyingmechanisms?
I study the impact of eliminating administrative trade barriers on economic growth
by lookingat the incorporating counties intoprefectures reform(ChexianShequ) inChina.
Previous studies have extensively documented local protectionism in China (Young,
2000; Bai, Du, Tao and Tong, 2004; Holz, 2009; Long and Wang, 2015; Barwick, Cao and
Li, 2017). The incorporating counties into prefectures reform is one of the central gov-
ernment’s attempts to eliminate regional administrative tradebarriers.1 The county gov-
ernment, which is at the fourth level of the administrative hierarchy in China, enjoys a
high level of fiscal and administrative autonomy. When a county is incorporated into
an adjacent prefecture, which is at the third level of the hierarchy, its government loses
its autonomy and becomes an agency for the prefecture government. Consequently, the
administrative barriers between the county and the prefecture disappear, and the two
local markets are expected to integrate.
As pointed out by Donaldson (2015), to empirically test the effect of trade barriers,
one needs to solve two challenges. The first challenge is to find a suitable control group
that can address the endogeneity issue. Tradebarriersmaynot be the only differencebe-
tween the treatment and the control group. The second challenge, as proposed byRubin
(1980), is that the control group and the treatment group should not interact; otherwise,
1Seeanews report that the reform inNingboPrefecture, ZhejiangProvince reduced the regional admin-
istrative tradebarriers, http://m.21jingji.com/article/20161011/433d3ea617b2d039480ff9972663cb64.html.
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there may be over-estimation or under-estimation, depending on the direction of the
spillover effect.
I adopt a difference-in-differences empirical strategy comparing the economic
growth of counties that were incorporated into prefectures to control counties, before
and after the reform. Two special features of this reform enable me to overcome the two
identification challenges. In the first approach, using information from prefecture gov-
ernments’ five-year city planning books, I construct a list of counties that were chosen
by the prefectures to be incorporated, but were not approved by the higher-level gov-
ernments for various political and geographical reasons. By comparing the treatment
group to this applied-but-failed group, I adjust for the nonrandom selection of counties
by the prefecture. The second approach takes advantage of the fact that among those
counties thatwere successfully incorporated, the timing of the incorporation is arguably
exogenous (i.e., no observable characteristics can predict the timing of incorporations).
Specifically, I compare counties that experienced the incorporation in year y to coun-
ties that would experience incorporation at least τ years later, e.g. in year y +τ and on-
wards. The two control groups also partially solve the second identification problem,
as the treatment counties and the control counties in both control groups are relatively
isolated geographically.
I use GDP and nighttime light intensity to measure economic activity. Nighttime
light intensity, gathered fromweather satellite recordings, has been increasingly used by
economists to measure economic activity in developing countries, especially at the lo-
cal level (Henderson, Storeygard and Weil, 2012; Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Storeygard,
2016). As nighttime light intensity is not susceptible to political manipulations, it com-
plements GDP as ameasure of economic activity.
Using both approaches, I find that the reform significantly increased economic
growth in the incorporated counties. Compared to the applied-but-failed counties, the
reform raised incorporated counties’GDPper capita by 12.6 percent, andnighttime light
intensity per square kilometer by 4.4 percent in ten years. Using the second approach,
I find that the reform led to a 9.3 percent increase in GDP per capita, and a 5.9 percent
increase in nighttime light intensity per square kilometer for counties that experienced
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current incorporation, compared to counties that would experience the reform several
years later. The effect of the reform is both immediate andpersistent. In the first year fol-
lowing the reform, the economic growth of the treated counties already surpassed that
of the control counties, suggesting that there were potential trades that were previously
prohibited by local protectionism. I also find that the treated counties still grew faster
than the control counties ten years after the reform, suggesting that the effects of the
reformwere persistent.
Onepotential concern is that the positive effects on treated countieswere drivenby a
migration of economic activity fromprefectures to the treated counties. Thus, I also look
at the impact of the reform on the overall economic growth. If the reform only induced
a transfer, then the overall economic growth of the treated counties and prefectures as a
whole should be the same with the control group. However, my results indicate that the
reform raised the overall GDP per capita by 6 percent.
Next, using Annual Industrial Surveys, a comprehensive firm panel dataset con-
ducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, I provide four pieces of evidence that are
consistent with the underlying mechanism for the reform’s positive effect on economic
growth beingmarket integration. First, I show that local protectionism - asmeasured by
Bai, Du, Tao and Tong (2004) - decreased. Bai, Du, Tao and Tong (2004) argue that if lo-
cal protectionism exists, industries with high shares of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
shouldbe less geographically concentrated. The rationale is that local governments tend
to protect SOEs to a larger extent than other types of enterprises, as they can capture
more resources from SOEs. I first show that the negative correlation between the share
of SOEs in an industry and its level of geographical concentration held true at the county
level in my dataset. I then show that the reform significantly reduced the negative cor-
relation in the treated counties, compared to the control counties. More specifically, the
negative correlation between the share of SOEs in an industry and its level of geograph-
ical concentration persisted in the control counties, but not in the treated counties.
Second, I test the impact of the pro-trade reform on the inter-sector reallocations
among the incorporated counties. Melitz (2003) show that international trade induces
reallocations towards the most productive firms: they tend to enter the export markets
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and absorb the shares of the less productive ones. The corresponding hypothesis in my
setting is that the reform eliminated the administrative trade barriers, and treated coun-
ties should specialize more in industries in which they had comparative advantages.
The results show that the production shares of themost productive sector in the treated
counties increased by 2 percentage points on average after the reform, which is a 25 per-
cent increase from their original level.2 The coefficient estimate of the effect is statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level.
Third, I show that the reduction in trade barriers enables the incorporated counties
to attract more firms producing tradable goods, which suggests that market access in
treated counties likely increased. While the impact of the reform on firms producing
nontradable goods is uncertain, I observe an immediate increase in the entry of firms
producing tradable goods in the treated counties compared to the control counties after
the reform. There is no significant increase in firms producing nontradable goods. The
immediate entry of firms suggests that the removal of trade barriers is the primary cause
of firm entry, since infrastructure improvement would take time to establish.
Fourth, I find that less profitable firms in the treated countieswere significantlymore
likely to exit after the reform. This is consistent with the mechanism that a reduction in
trade barriers increases the competition firms face, which forces less profitable firms to
exit (Melitz, 2003).
The findings contribute to the literature on domestic trade barriers and their impact
on economic growth. Recent studies have primarily looked at the effect of infrastructure
or of reducing transportation costs on development (Faber, 2014; Donaldson andHorn-
beck, 2016; Storeygard, 2016; Donaldson, 2018). For example, Donaldson (2018) exam-
ines the effect of the railroad network in colonial India on agricultural income. He finds
that access to railroads raised agricultural income by 16 percent, while access to lines
that were planned and surveyed, but never built has approximately zero effect. Mywork
complements the previouswork by identifying the effect of local protectionism, another
sourceof tradebarriers. My results indicate that eliminating local protectionismas away
of reducing trade costs also contributes to local economic growth. The project also con-
2The sector is defined at the 2-digit industry level.
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tributes to this literature by employing twonovel control groups to solve the problems of
endogeneity and spillover. The latter is possiblebecausemy treatedcounties andcontrol
counties are relatively geographically isolated.
My work also adds to the literature on local protectionism, especially in China. Us-
ing a province-level regional specialization index, previous studies have provided evi-
dence of local protectionism in China by showing insufficient specialization and an oth-
erwise unexplained correlation between regional specialization and industry character-
istics (Young, 2000; Bai, Du, Tao and Tong, 2004; Barwick, Cao and Li, 2017; Holz, 2009).
Mycontributions to this literature are threefold. First, I extend thepreviousanalysis from
province level to county level, amuchfinerunit. The fact thatprotectionpracticeswidely
existed at all local levels indicate that local protectionism is deeply rooted in China’s po-
litical system. Second, even though the existence of local protectionism has been well
documented, its impact on economic growth has rarely been discussed. One exception
is Barwick, Cao andLi (2017), who show that provincial protection inChina’s automobile
industry led to a substantial consumer welfare loss. I show that eliminating county-level
administrative barriers significantly contributed to local economic development. Third,
even though it was suggested in previous studies that the regionally decentralized au-
thoritarian regime is the cause of local protectionism, I empirically show that a reform
re-centralized authority indeed reduced local protectionism.
Lastly, the paper is also related to previous studies on the policy impact of the incor-
porating counties into prefectures reform (Tang andHewings, 2017; Liu, Zeng andZhou,
2019). I contribute to this literature by providing extensive firm-level evidence to show
that themechanism this reformpromoted economic growth is that it eliminated institu-
tional trade barriers between the incorporated counties and the prefectures. Moreover,
I construct two novel control groups to solve the problem of endogeneity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the institutional back-
ground and two important features of the incorporating counties into prefectures re-
form. Section 3 describes various data sources used in this study. Section 4 introduces
the empirical model, discussing the potential threats to the identification. I present the
main results in Section 5. In Section 6, I analyze the channels through which the reform
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increased economic development. Section 7 concludes and discusses the policy impli-
cation.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Local Protectionism
The problemof local protectionismhas hauntedChina over the last forty years. Even
though the central government has made great progress in transforming its centrally-
planned economy to a market-oriented economy, local authorities are still highly in-
volved in market activities across the country. Local governments use various methods
to shield localfirms fromcompetitors inother regions,whichcreates inter-regional trade
barriers that are harmful to domestic market integration.
It was hypothesized that the regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime is
the cause of local protectionism in China (Xu, 2011). Under RDA, the promotion of lo-
cal officials heavily depends on local GDP growth (Li and Zhou, 2005). Therefore, local
governments have strong incentives toprotect local firmswhoseproduction contributes
towards local GDP. In addition, under RDA, local governments have a high degree of fis-
cal autonomy. Tax revenues collected from firms account for about a third of the local
government total revenues.3 Consequently, concerns about revenue also motivate lo-
cal officials to protect local firms. To further exacerbate local protectionism, RDA also
empowers local officials to protect firms in their region. The administrative authority is
decentralized under RDA too. Local authorities can make localized regulations, or even
laws in some cases, to favor local firms. They also directly manage some state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and can directly invest in some privately owned firms.
As early as in themid-1980s, it was documented that local governments favored local
manufacturersby limiting themobilityof regional lowpriced-rawmaterials and reserved
them for the local firms (Watson, Findlay and Yintang, 1989; Bernstein and Lü, 2000).
3Data source: Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China (http://www.mof.gov.cn/).
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The central government issued an official order in 1982 to prohibit those practices. After
that, twoadditionaldecreeswere issuedby thecentral government inanattempt toelim-
inate local protectionism (Holz, 2009). However, protection activities did not disappear;
instead, they becamemore implicit and harder to detect in response.
Onemeans of local protection is a direct subsidy to local, government-owned SOEs.
Those SOEs can thus afford to operate even if they face continued losses. The business
decisions of those SOEs are also heavily influenced by the local government. The gov-
ernment can make them only buy raw materials and inputs from other local firms. For
example, it is widely reported that some local taxi firms only buy automobiles from local
car makers (Barwick, Cao and Li, 2017).
Local government can also protect local firms through favorable regulations and se-
lective law enforcement. The government can tailor their regulations so that only the
products of local firms can comply with them. For example, the 2018 market entry re-
quirements for new energy automobiles in Shanghai basically exclude all cars, except
for those made in Shanghai.4 Similarly, in the enforcement of laws or higher-order gov-
ernments’ policies, the local government can choose to enforce themonnon-local firms
selectively. For example, in a quality control test on electronic bikes conducted by the Li-
uzhou city government in 2015, all local brands passed the test and all non-local brands
failed the test.5
As the official orders have not been sufficient to curb local protectionism in the long-
run, the central government also experimented with a reform of incorporating counties
into prefectures, in the hope that themerger can eliminate the barriers between the two
regions. I analyze this reform in this paper.
1.2.2 Institutional Background
It is hard to understand the reform of incorporating counties into prefectures with-
out taking a closer look at the hierarchical structure of the administrative divisions in
4http://news.bitauto.com/hao/wenzhang/629965
5For details, please see the website of Administration for Industry and Commerce, Liuzhou, Guangxi
Province (http://gsj.liuzhou.gov.cn/tzgg/index.html).
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China. At the top of the hierarchy is the central government, followed by provincial-level
governments, prefecture-level governments and county-level governments (Figure 1.1).
Generally, each level is in charge of overseeing thework carried out by lower levels of the
administrative hierarchy.
Within the county level, there are counties and districts.6 Even though they are at the
same administrative level, the differences between them are substantial. Districts, for-
mally city-governed districts, are subdivisions of a prefecture or a direct-administered
municipality. District governments are agencies of the prefecture governments, and are
in charge of implementing the policies made by the prefecture governments. On the
other hand, county governments are relatively independent of the prefecture govern-
ments, and have a high degree of autonomy in both fiscal and administrative aspects.
Counties havemore autonomy thandistricts inbothfiscal revenue and spending. Af-
ter the Tax-Sharing Reform in 1994, the fiscal revenue of county-level governments can
be divided broadly into three categories: budgetary revenue, extra-budgetary revenue
and off-budget revenue. Budgetary revenue, including value-added tax, business tax,
local enterprise income tax and personal income tax, is shared between the county-level
governments and prefectural and provincial governments. The proportion of budgetary
revenue the county-level governments need to sharewith prefecture governments is sig-
nificantly lower for county governments than for district governments. This is partially
caused by the fact that the prefecture government can decide its cut of the district gov-
ernments’ revenue, butneed tonegotiatewith theprovincial governments to get ahigher
share of the county governments’ revenue. The extra-budgetary revenue includes a vari-
ety of non-tax items - paid use of state-owned resources and assets, state-owned capital
operating income, fines and confiscations, etc. The county-level governments do not
need to share most forms of the extra-budgetary revenue with its upper-level govern-
ment. However, counties are in charge of collecting more sources of extra-budgetary
income than districts, and are still more independent in this category. Also, land con-
6Counties are furtherdivided into county-level cities andcounties,with the formerhaving slightlymore
administrative autonomy. However, as the differences between them are small compared to their differ-
ences with districts, I do not distinguish between them in most parts of the paper and refer both of them
as counties.
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veyance fees - revenues from selling the land use rights to a private party, has gained
importance in recent years (Han and Kung, 2015). The county governments not only
have greater administrative authority to approve land transfers than the district govern-
ments, but also share less of the income with the prefecture governments. In terms of
fiscal spending, the districts also have less autonomy than counties, as the prefectures
control their spending, while the counties can freely use their revenue as long as they
meet the regulatory mandates.
As an agency of the prefecture governments, the district governments are also less
independent administratively compared to county governments. They have fewer func-
tions than the county governments, as many government functions have been central-
ized to prefectures. For example, the public security sub-bureau of the districts is man-
aged by the prefecture public security bureau, and thus is not part of the district gov-
ernment. The district governments have no final say in the relevant assessment of the
sub-bureau, or the appointment and removal of cadres in that department. However,
the county government directly controls the public security bureau in the county. In ad-
dition, thedistrict’s land resources andplanning, industry and commerce, quality super-
vision, tobacco monopoly, inspection and quarantine are also directly managed by the
prefecture bureaus.
Asdistrictshave lessfiscal andadministrative autonomy thancounties, transforming
counties into districts essentially means authority is re-centralized to the prefectures.
1.2.3 Two Special Features
Two special features of the incorporating counties into prefectures reformenableme
to identify the impact of market integration on economic growth.
The first special feature is that, due to the administrative procedure for this reform,
there exists anatural control group. For a county tobe incorporated into aprefecture, the
prefecture first needs to draft a list of counties they plan to merge. Then the prefecture
government exchanges information with the county governments to obtain their con-
sent. If the county government and the county’s people’s congress agree, the prefecture
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governmentwill submit a request to the provincial government. If the provincial govern-
ment approves the request, the proposal goes to the central government, which has the
final say on whether a county can be turned into a district and when that can happen.
The control group I employ in the first approach are counties that were chosen by
the prefectures to be absorbed, but the application had not been approved by the cen-
tral government at least until 2013, the last year covered by the study. I collect the list
of counties from the prefecture government’s five-year city planning books. As illus-
trated previously, the prefecture governments needed to choose a list of counties they
planned to incorporate. The list is usually published in its city planning book. For exam-
ple, Suzhou, a city in Jiangsu Province, stated that it planned to incorporate six counties
in its 1996planningyearbook: Zhangjiagang, Taicang,Changshu,Kunshan,Wuxian,Wu-
jiang (Suzhou City Planning Manual, 1996-2010). Not all proposed incorporations were
approved. Turning a county into a district is against the interest of the provincial gov-
ernment. At about the same time of the incorporating counties into prefectures reform,
there is another reform:sheng zhi guan xian, whichmeans provinces candirectly admin-
ister certain counties. A province-directly-administered county shares a larger propor-
tionof its tax revenuewith theprovinceandasmallerproportionwith theprefecture than
a normal county. As argued by Lu and Tsai (2019), therewas a strong inter-governmental
vertical competition in China’s urbanization process. A province has stronger incentives
to turn a normal county into a province-directly-administered county or at least keep its
county status. Therefore, most incorporation applications were blocked by provincial
governments. For example, Suzhou was only able to absorb two (Wuxian and Wujiang)
out of the six counties in its incorporation list till 2019. In particular, in exchange for
turningWujiang into a district, it had to allow Jiangsu province to directly administer its
richest county, Kunshan, which is also on its incorporation list (Cartier, 2016).
The central government may also reject or significantly delay the incorporation ap-
plications for various political and cultural concerns. For example, Shijiazhuang, the
capital city ofHebei Province, planned to incorporateZhengding, Luancheng,Gaocheng
and Luquan in both 2001 and 2006. While the other three have been successfully incor-
porated, Zhengding is still a county as of today. The reason is purely political - Presi-
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dent Xi Jinpingwas once the leader of theCommunist Party ofChina (CPC) inZhengding
county. To preserve his legacy, Zhengding must remain a county even though it has the
highest GDP per capita among the four counties in Shijiazhuang’s list and its city center
is the closest to Shijiazhuang.
Zhengding is not the only example; all the birthplaces of the former general secre-
taries of the Communist Party of China have not changed their statuses. In addition,
counties on the list of National Famous Historical and Cultural Cities are also immune
to incorporation to keep their historic county names.7
The second feature of this market integration reform is that the timing of the reform
varied substantially between andwithin prefectures. In Suzhou’s case, even though both
Wuxian andWujiang were on Suzhou’s incorporation list in 1996, the former was incor-
porated in 2000, while the latter was incorporated in 2012. Changzhou, a city also in
Jiangsu Province, planned to absorb Wujin, Liyang and Jintan in its 1996 city planning
book. Wujin was successfully incorporated into Changzhou city in 2002, while neither
Jintan nor Liyang were incorporated by 2013.
Many factors may affect the timing of the final incorporation. Occasionally, the cen-
tral governmentblocked theapplicationsof incorporation for several years. Forexample,
noapplications fromJiangsuprovincewere approvedbetween2005and2008. Provincial
and central government’s transitionsmay also affect the application process. For exam-
ple, Wuhan, a city in Hubei Province, started its application for incorporating Huangpi
county in 1996, and the applicationwas passed to the central government in 1997. How-
ever, due to government transition in 1997, the application was approved in late 1998
and Huangpi was formally incorporated in 1999.8
7As of 2015, there are 127 National Famous Historical and Cultural Cities in China. For the complete
list, please see http://news.youth.cn/jsxw/201509/t20150901_7072311_1.html
8Source in Chinese: https://hb.ifeng.com/a/20181227/7127581_0.html
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1.3 Data
I use data from many different sources to estimate the effect of the incorporating
counties into prefectures reformon economic development. In this section, I present an
overviewof thesedata sources and the constructionof the variables I use for the analysis.
I construct a panel dataset of counties that experienced the reform and counties that
applied for incorporation but hadn’t been approved by 2013. The information on treated
counties is obtained from thewebsite of theMinistry ofCivil Affairs ofChina.9 In order to
identify counties that applied for the reform but failed, I collect the list of control coun-
ties from the each prefecture’s city planning books, which are published every five years.
Note that I am only able to identify whether a county applied for the reform or not, but
not the year that the county applied for the reform for the first time. Figure 1.5 shows the
geographical distribution of incorporated counties and the applied-but-failed counties.
As the map shows, almost every province experienced at least one incorporation. Al-
though it’s a national reform, one can still observe some geographical patterns. Most of
the treated counties were located in eastern and central provinces, while some applied-
but-failed counties were scattered in the western provinces. For that reason, I only ex-
plore wthin-province variations in treated and applied-but-failed counties throughout
the paper.
Thenighttime light intensity data is obtained from theDefenseMeteorological Satel-
lite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) that reports satellite images of
the Earth between 20:30 and 22:00 local time. The satellite-year dataset is available for
every 30 arc-second pixel (approximately 1 square kilometer). The value of lights are in-
tegers values from 0 (no light) to 63. I use the average lights per square kilometer that
fall within the boundary of each county/district to proxy for the level of local economic
development.
I collect county-level GDP (including the shares of manufacturing and tertiary in-
dustry), population, government expenditure and revenue for the years 1995-2013 from
9I dropped counties that weremergedwith a district into a new district because we cannot identify the
outcome after the reform. I also dropped counties that experienced the reform but all things remained
unchanged for at least five years.
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provincial and prefectural statistical yearbooks.
In addition, I observe firms’ activities from China’s Annual Industrial Survey from
1998-2007. The survey includes information for all state-owned industrial firms and
non-state owned firms with prime operation revenue above 5 million RMB. From the
annual survey data, I can observe a firm’s profit, revenue, employment, industry codes,
location at the county level, the year that the firm was founded, the year that the firm
exited. Using firm-level data, I estimate firms’ productivity, identify the firms’ entry and
exit, and calculate the geographical concentration of industries at the prefecture-year
level for themechanism analysis in Section 1.6.
For the main empirical estimation, I limit the sample to the time period 1995-2013.
The years before 1995 are excluded because a nation-wide tax-sharing reform took place
in 1994. The reason I choose to look at years up to 2013 is that the publicly available
nighttime lights data is only provided until 2013.
Table 1.1 presents county-level characteristics for incorporated counties and
applied-but-failed counties (columns 1 and 2) in the baseline year. There are 71 counties
that experienced the reform, and 188 counties that applied for incorporation but failed.
Columns 3 and 4 report differences and p-values conditional on province fixed effects.
Compared to the applied-but-failed counties, the incorporated counties havemorepop-
ulation, food possession per capita, a lower share of rural population, a higher share of
manufacturing and tertiary industry, savings and loans, and a student-teacher ratio. No-
tably, onlyoneof the elevenvariables are statistically different at the10percent level, and
one is at the 1 percent level. Overall, table 1.1 shows that the research design comparing
incorporated counties to applied-but-failed counties balances many (although not all)
observable covariates, once accounting for average characteristics in the province.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
DID comparing incorporated counties to applied-but-failed counties. In the first
approach, I estimate the effects of the reform on a set of county-level outcomes in a
14
difference-in-differences framework. Specifically, I compare the evolution of outcomes
for counties that were successfully incorporated to counties that applied for the incor-
poration but failed for various political and historical reasons. The equation takes the
following form:
ycpt =βRe f ormct +θc +δpt +²cpt (1.1)
where ycpt is the outcome variable of interest for county c in province p at year t. Here
I look at the log of GDP per capita and log of (1+nighttime lights per square kilometer).
The main coefficient of interest is Re f ormct , an indicator variable that equals 1 for the
treated county in years after the incorporation, and0 for all other cases. θc andδpt are full
sets of county and province×year fixed effects. By conditioning on county fixed effects,
the empirical specification absorbs all time-invariant county-specific characteristics. By
conditioning on province-year fixed effects, I can control cross-year common changes
in provinces that occur even in the absence of the incorporation. Lastly, ²cpt is the error
term. Standard errors are clustered at the county level to allow for correlation over time
within a county.
The difference-in-differences specification relies on the assumption that, in the ab-
sence of the reform, the change of outcomes in incorporated counties and applied-but-
failed counties before the reform should have parallel trends. I test the validity of this
assumption by plotting coefficients of βτs and the corresponding 95 percent confidence
intervals of the following equation:
ycpt =
10∑
i=−5
βτDtoRe f orm
τ
ct +θc +δpt +²cpt (1.2)
whereDtoRe f ormτct are indicator variables that equal 1 if year t is τ years after (or before,
if negative) the year of incorporation and 0 otherwise; for control counties, it equals 0 in
all years. The indicator of “the year before the incorporation" is omitted as the reference
year. The coefficients of interest are βτs; they represent the differences between treated
and control counties in outcome Y , τ years after the incorporation. For GDP per capita
and nighttime lights, none of the coefficients before the incorporation are significantly
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different fromzero. They are also small inmagnitude, but they become consistently pos-
itive after the incorporation (Figure 1.9).
DID using variation in the timing of incorporation. One natural concern for the
first approach is that theremight still be some other systematic differences between the
incorporated counties and the applied-but-failed counties other than changes in trade
barriers. To address this issue, I exploit the variation in the timing of the reforms as an
alternative estimation approach. I employ a difference-in-differences strategy that com-
pareseconomicgrowth incounties that experience thecurrent incorporation tocounties
thatwould experience the reform several years later, before and after the current reform.
Even though the treatedcountiesmaynotbe randomly selected, I showevidence that the
timingof the incorporation is arguably exogenous (i.e., noobservable characteristics can
predict the timing of incoporations) in Appendix 4.110.
I construct the sample following Deshpande and Li (2019). For each of the 71 incor-
porations, I take the county that experienced the current incorporation as the treated
county, and construct the corresponding control group as counties that would experi-
ence incorporation more than five years in the future. The year of the incorporation is
set to be year 0. I restrict my sample to event years from -5 to 5 such that the control
counties haven’t experienced the reform yet. Lastly, I combine all 71 incorporations and
build one dataset.
This approach only uses variation in the timing of incorporation, not variation in
the event of incorporation (Guryan, 2004; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2015; Deshpande and Li,
2019). The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that, in the
absence of the reform, the change of economic growth in counties that experienced the
10To examine whether local characteristics predict the timing of the reform conditional on the reform, I
limit the sample to counties that haven’t been incorporated in that year but will be turned into districts in
the future. I estimate the following equation:
Re f ormYc =α+ΓXc +²c
where Re f ormYC is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the county received the treatment in the year in-
dicated in the column heading. Xc is a vector of county-level characteristics. I include population (lag),
manufacturing share of GDP (lag), tertiary share of GDP (lag), ratio of government expenditure to govern-
ment revenue (lag), ratio of government revenue to GDP (lag), ratio of government expenditure to GDP
(lag), log of lights per square kilometer (lag), dummy of provincial capital, dummy of direct-administered
municipalities of China.
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earlier incorporationwouldhave trends parallel to those experienced incorporation sev-
eral years later. This empirical approach requires the timing of the incorporations to be
as good as random. To this end, I demonstrate that the timing of the reform cannot be
predicted by observable characteristics in Table 4.1. This suggests that the timing of the
reform is arguably exogenous. To validate this approach, I re-run the test on the parallel-
trends assumptionwith this newcontrol group. Figure 1.10 shows that counties incorpo-
rated earlier and counties incorporated later do exhibit parallel trends in the years before
the incorporation, both in nighttime lights and in GDP per capita.
To estimate the effects of the reform in regression form using only time variation, I
estimate the following equation on the sample:
ycpi t = θc +δpt +β0Treatedci +
∑
τ
Dτi t +
∑
τ
βτ(Treatedci ×Dτi t )+²cpi t (1.3)
where ycpi t is the outcome for county c in province p for incorporation i at year t. The θc
are county fixed effects, and δpt are year×province fixed effects. The variable Treatedci
is an indicator equal to 1 if county c is a treated county for incorporation i.11 TheDτi t are
indicators equal to 1 if year t is τ years after (or before, if negative) the year of the incor-
poration and0otherwise. I cluster standard errors at the county level. The coefficients of
interest are the βτs, capturing the differences in economic growth between treated and
control counties τ years after (or before, if negative) the incorporation.
For table estimates, I estimate the followingmodel:
ycpi t = θc +δpt +β0Treatedci +δ0Posti t +β(Treatedci ×Posti t )+²cpi t (1.4)
where Posti t is an indicator equal to 1 if year t is after the incorporation.
There’s a trade-off in the choice of year gap between the treatment and control group
experiencing the reform. While a small year gap is preferable since the control counties
are more closely comparable to the treatment counties, it also imposes an upper bound
on the time horizon of the analysis (i.e., I can only identify the effect up to that year gap).
I present the main results using a five-year gap such that I can identify effects up to five
11Since the same county can appear as a control and a treated county in the data, Treatedci is not co-
linear with the county fixed effects
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years after the reform. In robustness checks, I demonstrate that the results are robust if
I change the year gap to three-year, four-year, six-year, and seven-year gaps (Appendix
Figure 4.2).
1.5 Estimates of the Effect of the Reform on Economic Growth
1.5.1 DID Comparing Incorporated Counties to Applied-but-failed Counties
I begin the regression analysis by estimating the difference-in-differences model in
equation 1.1. In Table 1.2, columns 1 and 3 are the baseline estimates using a parsimo-
nious specification that includesonlycountyandprovince×yearfixedeffects. I add time-
varying county-level controls in columns 2 and 4, including the manufacturing share of
GDP, the tertiary industry share of GDP, and the ratio of government expenditure to gov-
ernment revenue.
Figure 1.9 shows the effect of the reform on the log of GDP per capita and lights per
square kilometer respectively, based on estimates from equation 1.2. The treated coun-
ties did not significantly differ from the applied-but-failed counties prior to the treat-
ment. GDP per capita in the treated counties after the reform increased by 11 percent
over the control counties (Table 1.2). The growth rate of GDP per capita shows a gradual
increase over 10 years (Figure 1.9, (a)). Consistent with the results on GDP, the average
magnitudeof the effect on lights per square kilometer is 4.4 percent increase. It takes two
years after the reform for lights to reach a stable 10 percent increase.
Overall effect. Next, I explore the overall impact of the reform on the economic
growth of the treated counties and the corresponding prefectures as a whole. The unit
of observation for overall effect is prefecture-year. Using the same empirical strategy, I
compare prefectures that experienced the reform to prefectures that applied for the re-
form but failed, before and after the reform. For prefectures that have experienced sev-
eral incorporations, I only focus on the first reform. I estimate a prefecture-level version
of equation 1.1.
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Figure 1.11 depicts the effect of the reform for the treated counties and the corre-
sponding prefectures as a whole. The treated and control prefectures exhibit parallel
trends in GDP per capita and nighttime lights before event year 0, based on estimates
from a prefecture-level version of equation 1.2. Table 1.4 shows that the treated counties
and prefectures as a whole gain in GDP per capita by 6 percent as a result of the reform.
And the estimates are significant at 10 percent level. Notice that the results on night-
time lights are consistent with the results on GDP qualitatively but they are statistically
insignificant. The possible reason is that the intensity of nighttime lights is capped at 63
and there is little brightness potential for the already-lighted prefectures.
1.5.2 DIDUsing Variation in the Timing of Incorporation
To deal with the concern that there might be other systematic differences between
incorporated counties and applied-but-failed counties, I exploit only variation in the
timing of the reform. Appendix table 4.1 shows that no observable characteristics can
persistently predict the timing of incorporations. In the main results, I compare coun-
ties that experience the current reform to counties that experience the reform five years
later. I demonstrate that themain results are robust todifferent year gaps inSection1.5.3.
Figure 1.10 shows that the treated and control counties exhibit parallel trends inGDPper
capita and nighttime lights prior to event year 0, based on estimates from equation 1.3.
GDP per capita and lights per square kilometer increase by 10 percent and 6 percent re-
spectively as a result of the reform in the treated counties (Table 1.3). The estimates for
the difference between the two groups of counties are economically large and statisti-
cally significant at less than 5 percent.
1.5.3 Robustness
The identifying assumption of the first method is that treatment and control coun-
ties would experience parallel trends in outcomes in the absence of the reform. As seen
in Figures 1.9 and 1.10, control and treatment counties exhibit parallel trends in the av-
erage nighttime lights andGDPper capita prior to the reform. However, it is still possible
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that the reform itself is selected by the central government, and this selection could lead
to changes in economic development in those counties. The central government might
tend to choose richer counties for the reform. To address this concern, I re-run themain
results without observations from the direct-administered municipalities of China12. I
find consistent results (in Appendix Figure 4.2) with even biggermagnitudes, suggesting
that the positive impact of the reform is not driven by selection.
I use the five-year gap in the second approach as my main results. As a robustness
check, I estimate the effects of the reform using alternative year gaps. Appendix Figure
4.2 shows that the results are robust if I change the year gap to a three-year, four-year, six-
year or seven-year gap. Specifically, using alternative year gaps, the treated and control
counties exhibit parallel trends inGDPper capita andnighttime lights prior to event year
0; and the reform has a significantly positive impact on GDP per capita and lights per
square kilometer.
1.6 Mechanism
Results in the previous section indicate that the reform had a significantly positive
impact on economic growth, both immediately and persistently. The next question is:
what are the mechanisms underlying this positive impact? My hypothesis is the posi-
tive impact of the reform is due to the removal of administrative trade barriers between
the prefecture and the incorporated county after they have merged into a new prefec-
ture. While I cannot directly observe the reduction in trade costs, I provide four pieces of
evidence that are consistent with the hypothesis of a reduction in administrative trade
barriers using firm-level data from the Annual Industrial Surveys.
An indirect measure of local protectionism. In the first piece of evidence, I show
that local protectionism, as measured by Bai, Du, Tao and Tong (2004), decreased. Bai,
Du, Tao and Tong (2004) argue that local governments tend to protect SOEs to a larger
extent compared to other types of enterprises since they can derive much more bene-
12The Direct-administeredmunicipalities of China are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.
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fits from SOEs. So if local protectionism exists, industries with high shares of SOEs are
less geographically concentrated. I first show that the negative correlation between the
share of SOEs in an industry and its level of geographical concentration still existed at the
county level. I then show that the reform significantly reduced the negative correlation
in the treated counties compared to the control counties.
I calculate the concentration index developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) to mea-
sure the geographic concentration of a specific industrywithin aprefecture. TheEllison-
Glaeser index takes the following form:
γi j ≡
Gi j − (1−∑c x2c j )Hi j
(1−∑c x2c j )(1−Hi j ) (1.5)
where γi j is the Ellison-Glaeser index calculated at industry i in prefecture j. Gi j ≡∑
c(sci j − xc j )2 is the raw concentration, where c is any county in prefecture j, sci j is the
share of employment for county c in industry i and xc j is the share of total employment
of all industries in county c. Hi j ≡∑i j z2i j is theHerfindahl indexof industry i inprefecture
j, with zi j representing the employment share of a particular firm in industry i in prefec-
ture j. The greater the Ellison-Glaeser index, the higher the geographic concentration. It
equals zero if all firms randomly pick their locations.
To examine the abovehypothesis, I employ a triple-differences framework as follows:
γi j pt =αi +θ j +δpt +β1ssoei t +β2ssoei t × treatCi t y j +β3(ssoei t ×Re f orm j t )
+β4Re f orm j t +
∑
t
βt (ssoei t ×δt )+²i j pt
(1.6)
where γi j t is the Ellison-Glaeser index in industry i, prefecture j of province p in year t.
ssoei t is the share of SOEs in industry i in year t.13 The coefficients of interest are β1 and
β3. αi , θ j and δpt are full sets of industry, prefecture and province-year fixed effects.
Column1of Table 1.5 firstly establishes thenegative correlation found inBai, Du, Tao
and Tong (2004), namely industries with a high share of SOEs were less geographically
concentrated. While Bai, Du, Tao and Tong (2004) study this correlation at the provincial
level, my results show that local protectionism also exists at the county level. Column 2
13I define the share of SOEs as the ratio of total number of SOEs to total numer of all firms.
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further shows that the reform significantly decreased the negative correlation between
SOE share and concentration for treated counties after the reform compared to the con-
trol counties. More specifically, in the control counties industries with high shares of
SOEs were still less geographically concentrated. And the estimate is statistically signifi-
cant at 1percent level. While thenegative correlationdisappeared in the treatedcounties
after the reform and the magnitude of the correlation is not statistically different from
zero.
Inter-sector reallocation. Second, following Melitz (2003)’s analysis on the effect of
exposure to trade on inter-firm reallocations, I test the impact of the pro-trade reform
on the inter-sector reallocations among the treated counties. The hypothesis is that the
reformeliminated theadministrative tradebarriers, and the treatedcounties should spe-
cialize more in industries in which they have comparative advantages. First, I estimate
firms’ productivity (or total factor productivity, TFP) using Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer
(2006)’s method, which is commonly used in the literature. Then I find the most pro-
ductive sectors at the 2-digit industry level in the baseline year by aggregating TFP at the
county-sector-year level. I compare the evolution of production shares of the most pro-
ductive sectors for treatedcounties to counties that appliedbut failedusing the following
equation:
ProductionSharescpt =βRe f ormsct +θc +δpt +²scpt (1.7)
where ProductionSharesct is the production share of sector s in county c of province p
at year t. Each sector’s production share is defined as the sector’s output as a percentage
of that county’s total output.
Table 1.6 shows that compared to the applied-but-failed counties, the reform caused
1 percentage point increase (a 12 percent increase) in production share for each of the
three most productive sectors (p-value=0.034) and a 2 percentage point increase (a 25
percent increase) for themost productive sector (p-value=0.069) in the treated counties.
Estimates are statistically significant and economically large. Figure 1.12 further shows
that the increase in production share is not driven by pre-trends.
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Firms’ entry. As the incorporating counties into prefectures reform granted the in-
corporated counties access to the prefecture market, the market access of firms in the
incorporated counties should increase following the reform. One way to test this hy-
pothesis is to look at entries of firms in those counties. As market access was enlarged
by the reform, those counties should attract more firms producing tradable goods, but
not more firms producing nontradable goods. I construct the firm entry panel for the
treatment and control counties each year using data from the Annual Industrial Survey.
Consistent with my hypothesis, Figure 1.13 (based on estimating equation 1.2) dis-
plays an immediately entry of firms producing tradable goods in the treated counties
compared to control counties. There is no significant increase in firms producing non-
tradable goods.14 The different effects on firms producing tradable goods and nontrad-
able goods suggest an increase inmarket access for the treated counties after the reform.
The immediate entry of firms strongly indicates that the removal of trade barriers is the
primary cause of firm entries, rather than infrastructure improvement, which takes time
to establish. Notice that firms producing tradable goods started to enter even one year
before the formal announcement of the reform (Figure 1.13). Thepossible explanation is
that firms (and the treated counties) already knew about the incorporation ahead of the
formal announcement by the central government. To further show that the immediate
entry of firms is not driven by the positive impact in the year before the reform, I dummy
out one year before the reform in Table 1.7 columns 2 and 4. The results are consistent.
Firms’ exit. Lastly, I test the hypothesis that a reduction in trade barriers increases
the competition firms face, which forces less profitable firms to exit. As the Annual In-
dustrial Survey is conducted annually, I amable to know the exact year a firmexits. More
specifically, if the firm is in the dataset in year y , but not in year y+1 and onwards, I then
define its exit year as year y +1. Due to the limitation of the Annual Industrial Survey, I
can only accurately observe SOEs’ exit.15 Fromnowon I only focus on SOEs’ exit. I adopt
14This result should be interpreted with caution because I do not havemany observations of firms pro-
ducing nontradable goods inmy dataset. The annual survey of industrial firms only includes State-owned
enterprises and large-scale firms. I cannot rule out the possibility that the reason why I do not find a sig-
nificant result on firms producing nontradable goods is that they are mainly small-scale private firms.
15The Annual Industrial Survey include all SOEs. But for non-state firms, only those whose sales are
above 5 million RMB are included. There are two potential reasons for me to observe some private firms
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a triple-differences approach based on equation 1.8
Exi ti cpt = θc +δpt +β1pro f i tMar g ini c,t−1+β2pro f i tMar g ini c,t−1×
treatCount yc +β3(pro f i tMar g ini c,t−1×Re f ormct )+β4Re f ormct
+∑
t
βt (pro f i tMar g ini c,t−1×δt )+²i cpt
(1.8)
where Exi ti cpt is an indicator equals to 1 if firm i in county c of province p exits at year
t. pro f i tMar g ini c,t−1 is the profit margin, which is defined as profit as a percentage of
revenue, for firm i in year t-1. treatCount yc is an indicator equals to 1 if county c is in-
corporated.
I find that the firms with lower profit margins in the treated counties had a signif-
icantly higher probability of closing down after the reform compare to similar firms in
the control counties (Table 1.8). Column 1 shows the less profitable firms were in gen-
eral more likely to exit than more profitable firms, which is consistent with basic eco-
nomic intuition. Column 2 presents that the probability of exiting for a firm with a low
profitmargin in the treated counties is three times larger than that of a firm in the control
group, likely due to the reform.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of eliminating administrative trade barriers on eco-
nomic growth by looking at a policy reform in China. Even though we are in the age of
globalization, trade is not always free, even within nations. There are multiple admin-
istrative trade barriers made by governments in different regimes that impede market
integration and, consequently, economic growth. In particular, despite China’s massive
success in the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented econ-
omy, local governments stillwidelyutilize their administrative autonomy toprotect local
disappeared from the annual survey: one is that the private firm exits themarket, the other is that the size
of the private firm shrinks below the 5-million-RMB threshold. I cannot distinguish between the two.
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firms from outside competition. The reform I study in this work is an attempt to solve
this problem by incorporating counties into prefectures and thus eliminating barriers
between them.
I find that counties that were incorporated into adjacent prefectures experienced
higher economic growth after the reform, both immediately and in the long-run com-
pared to the control group counties. Two special features of this reform enable me to
solve two challenges in identification for the literature on the impact of trade barriers,
namely endogeneity and spillover. The first special feature is that the applications of
some counties that were selected by the prefectures to be incorporated were eventually
denied by the higher level governments due to multiple political and geographical rea-
sons. Second, among those counties that were successfully incorporated, the timing of
the incorporations varied substantially. A simple test suggests that those variations are
random. The two control groups constructed using the two features allow me to solve
the endogeneity problem and limit the spillover effects to a large extent.
I also provide suggestive evidence that it is the reform’s impact onmarket integration
that drives its positive effect on economic growth. I first utilize an indirect measure of
local protectionism to test whether the reform indeed reduced protection practices be-
tween theprefecturesand the incorporatedcounties. The results indicate that the reform
essentially eliminated protectionism in the treated regions, while protection practices
still existed in the control regions. Second, I find that the treated counties reallocated
their production towardsmore productive sections after the reform, which is consistent
with Melitz (2003)’s analysis on exposure to international trade. Third, I find that more
firmsproducing tradable goods immediately entered the incorporated counties than the
control counties, and there were no such trends for firms producing nontradable goods.
Fourth, less profitable firms in the incorporated counties becamemore likely to exit after
the reform.
Broadly, thispaperalso sheds lighton theoptimaldegreeofdecentralization. The last
three decades have witnessed an unprecedented increase in decentralization reforms
in both developed and developing countries. Those reforms, and in particular, their ef-
fects on economic growth, have drawnmuch attention from the economics community.
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Scholars argued that, theoretically, decentralization can boost economic growth as gov-
ernments aremore efficient at providing public services at a local level, and competition
between local governments constrains the Leviathan government. However, decentral-
ization can also lead to a race to the bottom and local protectionism, resulting in less
inter-jurisdictional trade and slower economic growth. This paper provides empirical
evidence of the negative impact of decentralization. The reform in my work is, in some
sense, a centralization reform. It can eliminate trade barriers because authority is cen-
tralized into the higher-level government, and thus, the higher-level government can
make decisions that are mutually beneficial to both the lower-level government and it-
self. The positive impact of this reform indicates that even though decentralization can
bebeneficial to economicgrowth (Davoodi andZou, 1998; ZhangandZou, 1998;Xie, Zou
andDavoodi, 1999), it is not always the case and full decentralizationmaynot beoptimal
(Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005; Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu, 2008; Gemmell, Kneller
and Sanz, 2013).
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1.8 Figures and Tables
Nation
Province
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District County
Reform
Figure 1.1: Government Structure in China
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Notes: Themap gives the locations of the incorporated counties in year 1998.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from theMinistry of Civil Affairs of China
Figure 1.2: Geographical Distribution of Treated Counties in Year 1998
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Notes: Themap gives the locations of the incorporated counties by Year 2004.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from theMinistry of Civil Affairs of China
Figure 1.3: Geographical Distribution of Treated Counties by Year 2004
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Notes: Themap gives the locations of the incorporated counties by year 2013.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from theMinistry of Civil Affairs of China
Figure 1.4: Geographical Distribution of treated counties by Year 2013
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Notes: Themap gives the locations of the incorporated counties and applied-but-failed by year 2013.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China and prefectures’
city-planning books.
Figure 1.5: Geographical Distribution of Treated and Control Counties
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(a) Year 1995 (b) Year 2001
(c) Year 2007 (d) Year 2013
Notes: Themap shows the evolution of nighttime lights in Hangzhou Prefecture in Zhejiang Province
from1995 to 2013. Districts are regionswith black boundaries. Incorporated counties are regionswith
red boundaries. Other counties under Hangzhou’s supervision are in gray boundaries.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China and the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).
Figure 1.6: The Impact of Market Integration: A Case Study of Hangzhou Prefecture
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(a) Year 1995 (b) Year 2002
(c) Year 2007 (d) Year 2013
Notes: Themap shows the evolutionof nighttime lights inTangshanPrefecture inHebei Province from
1995 to 2013. Districts are regions with black boundaries. Incorporated counties are regions with red
boundaries. Other counties under Tangshan’s supervision are in gray boundaries.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China and the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).
Figure 1.7: The Impact of Market Integration: A Case Study of Tangshan Prefecture
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(a) Year 1995 (b) Year 2002
(c) Year 2007 (d) Year 2013
Notes: Themap shows the evolutionof nighttime lights inHengshui Prefecture inHebei Province from
1995 to 2013. Districts are regionswith black boundaries. Applied-but-failed counties are regionswith
red boundaries. Other counties under Hengshui’s supervision are in gray boundaries.
Source: Author’s mapping based on data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs of China and the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS).
Figure 1.8: The Impact of Market Integration: A Case Study of Hengshui Prefecture
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(a) The Impact on GDP per capita
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(b) The Impact on Lights per km2
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the effect of the incorporation reform on GDP and nighttime lights
in treated counties in the years before and after the reform, based on estimates of coefficients from
equation 1.2. The dependent variables are the log of GDP per capita or the log of nighttime lights per
km2. Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for outcomes (solid series).
Figure 1.9: The Impact of Market Integration on Economic Development (Approach I)
35
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Lo
g 
of
 G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Year relative to the reform
(a) The impact on GDP per capita
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(b) The Impact on Lights per km2
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the effect of the incorporation reform on GDP and nighttime lights
in treated counties in the years before and after the reform, based on estimates of coefficients from
equation 1.3. The dependent variables are the log of GDP per capita or the log of nighttime lights per
km2. Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for outcomes (solid series).
Figure 1.10: The Impact ofMarket Integration on Economic Development (Approach II)
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(a) The Impact on GDP per capita
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(b) The Impact on Lights per km2
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the effect of the incorporation reform on GDP and nighttime lights
in treated prefecture in the years before and after the reform, based on estimates of coefficients from
equation 1.2. The dependent variables are the log of GDP per capita or the log of nighttime lights per
km2. Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for outcomes (solid series).
Figure 1.11: The Overall Impact of Market Integration on Economic Development
37
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
S
ha
re
 (%
)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Year relative to the reform
(a) Top 3 productive sectors
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(b) Top 1 productive sector
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the effect of the incorporation reformonproduction share of themost
productive sectors in treated counties in the years before and after the reform, based on estimates of
coefficients fromequation 1.2. The dependent variable is the production share of themost productive
sectors at the 2-digit industry level, which is defined as the output of the sector as a percentage of
the county’s total output. The sample contains the top three productive sectors in panel (a) and the
most productive sector in panel (b). Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for outcomes (solid
series).
Figure 1.12: The Effect of Market Integration on Reallocation
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(a) The Impact on tradable sector
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(b) The impact on nontradable sector
Notes: Figure plots estimates of the effect of the incorporation reform on the number of new firms
in treated counties in the years before and after the reform, based on estimates of coefficients from
equation 1.2. The sample in panel (a) are firms producing tradable goods, including all manufactur-
ingfirms. The sample inpanel (b) are firmsproducingnontradable goods, consisting of health, educa-
tion,retail and construction. Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for outcomes (solid series).
Figure 1.13: The Effect of Market integration on Firms’ Entry
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics (Baseline Year)
Incorporated Applied-but-failed
counties counties p-Value
(1) (2) (3)
Population (log) 4.170 3.809 0.053
(.538) (.636)
Share of rural population .848 .868 0.131
(.076) (.108)
Share of rural labor participation .444 .432 0.801
(.072) (.086)
Food possession per capita 494.8 488.6 0.375
(220.8) (257.8)
Manufacturing share of GDP .454 .378 0.001
(.090) (.210)
Tertiary industry share of GDP .290 .271 0.939
(.077) (.067)
Ratio of gov. expenditure to gov. revenue 1.706 1.879 0.166
(.756) (1.607)
Saving share of GDP .491 .514 0.837
(.238) ( .752)
Loan share of GDP .613 .615 0.598
(.333) ( .596)
Students per 10000 people 1564.4 1654.3 0.430
(322.1) (318.3)
Student-teacher ratio 20.92 19.02 0.792
( 18.59) (4.758)
Number of Counties 71 188 -
Note: This table reports the summary statisticsof the treatment andapplied-but-failedcounties.
Column 3 and 4 report differences and p-values conditional on province fixed effects.
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Table 1.2: Estimated Effects of the Reform on Economic Growth
Dependent variable Log of GDP per capita Log of lights per km2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform 0.122*** 0.111*** 0.063*** 0.041*
(0.035) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023)
County-level controls Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,648 4,458 4,921 4,452
R-squared 0.964 0.970 0.984 0.985
Mean DV 8.968 8.968 1.727 1.730
Std.Dev. DV 0.913 0.913 0.877 0.840
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents estimates of β1 from
equation 1.1. All regressions include a full set of county and province×year fixed
effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the county level.
The county-level controls include manufacturing share of GDP, tertiary industry
share of GDP, ratio of government expenditure to government revenue. Log of
population is also included as the county-level control for the results onnighttime
lights.
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Table 1.3: Estimated Effects of the Reform on Economic Growth: Use
Time Variation
Dependent variable Log of GDP per capita Log of lights per km2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment×Post 0.115*** 0.120*** 0.095*** 0.051**
(0.042) (0.044) (0.027) (0.025)
County-level controls Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 10,298 10,033 10,344 10,033
R-squared 0.976 0.983 0.988 0.990
Mean DV 8.757 8.784 1.738 1.760
Std.Dev. DV 0.639 0.621 0.707 0.685
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents estimates of β1 from
equation 1.4. All regressions include a full set of county and province×year fixed
effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the incorporation
level. The county-level controls include manufacturing share of GDP, tertiary in-
dustry share ofGDP, ratio of government expenditure to government revenue. Log
of population is also included as the county-level control for the results on night-
time lights.
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Table 1.4: Overall Effect of the Reform on Prefectures’s Economic
Growth
Dependent variable Log of GDP per capita Log of lights per km2
(1) (2)
Treatment×Post 0.059* 0.012
(0.033) (0.023)
Prefecture FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Observations 2,795 2,810
R-squared 0.966 0.985
Mean DV 9.385 2.041
Std.Dev. DV 0.913 0.826
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents estimates of β1 from
equation 1.1 at prefecture level. All regressions include a full set of prefecture
and province×year fixed effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clus-
teredat theprefecture level. Logofpopulation is includedas theprefecture-level
control for the results on nighttime lights.
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Table 1.5: Mechanism: Geographical
Concentration
Dependent variable Concentration Index
(1) (2)
Share of SOEs -0.090** -0.125***
(0.038) (0.048)
Share of SOEs×Treat 0.035
(0.051)
Share of SOEs×Treat×Post 0.116**
(0.051)
Industry FE Y Y
Prefecture FE Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y
Observations 132,444 132,444
R-squared 0.087 0.088
Mean DV 0.215 0.215
Std.Dev. DV 0.594 0.594
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents
estimates of β1, β2 and β3 from equation 1.6. All regres-
sions include a full set of county and province×year fixed
effects (not reported). In parentheses are standard errors
clustered by incorporation. Number of clusters: 152. The
industry level controls include number of firms (log), av-
erage profit (log) and average employment (log). Number
of prefectures: 152 (45 prefectures in treatment and 107 in
control). Number of manufacturing industries defined by
the four-digit classifications: 424.
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Table 1.6: Mechanism: Inter-sector Reallocation
Dependent variable Production Shares for Most Productive Sectors
Top three sectors Top sector
(1) (2)
Reform 1.031** 2.102*
(0.493) (1.179)
County FE Y Y
Province * Year FE Y Y
Observations 5,828 1,871
R-squared 0.343 0.869
Mean DV 8.564 8.550
Std.Dev. DV 13.187 12.826
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the production
share of the most productive sectors at the 2-digit industry level, which is de-
fined as the output of the sector as a percentage of the county’s total output. The
columns presents estimates of β1 from equation 1.1. All regressions include a full
set of county and province×year fixed effect. The sample contains the top three
productive sectors in column (1) and the most productive sector in column (2).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.7: Mechanism: Firms’ Entry
Dependent variable Number of New Firms
Tradable sector nontradable sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform 16.769*** 20.161*** -0.028 0.058
(5.550) (6.346) (0.343) (0.402)
One Year relative to the reform 15.740** 0.372
(6.420) (0.459)
County FE Y Y Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,063 3,063 594 594
R-squared 0.912 0.913 0.558 0.559
Mean DV 35.092 35.092 1.700 1.700
Std.Dev. DV 63.553 63.553 1.237 1.237
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the the number of new
firms. The columns presents estimates of β1 from equation 1.1. All regressions include a
full set of county and province×year fixed effect. The sample in columns 1 and 2 are firms
producing tradable goods, including all manufacturing firms. The sample in columns
3 and 4 are firms producing nontradable goods, consisting of firms providing services
in health, education,retail and construction. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.8: Mechanism: Firms’ Exit
Dependent variable Dummy for Exit
(1) (2)
Profit margin(lag) -0.026*** -0.011**
(0.004) (0.004)
Profit margin(lag)×Treat -0.010
(0.007)
Profit margin(lag)×Treat×Post -0.027**
(0.013)
Industry FE Y Y
County FE Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y
Observations 247,617 247,617
R-squared 0.060 0.061
Mean DV 0.119 0.119
Std.Dev. DV 0.324 0.324
Note: Profit margin is defines as profit as a percentage of rev-
enue. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents
estimates of β1, β2 and β3 from equation 1.8. All regressions
include a full set of county, industry (at the 4-digit level) and
province×year fixed effects (not reported). Inparentheses are
standard errors clustered by county.
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2.0 Responsibility-Shifting through Delegation: Evidence fromChina’s One-Child
Policy
There is a growing body of experimental evidence indicating that delegation can
foster the shifting of responsibility for unpopular actions from a principal to an agent
(Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012). Using the well-known episode of the one-child pol-
icy in China (OCP), we provide field evidence for responsibility shifting through delega-
tion. Wecompare the impactof theOCPonparentswhoexperienced it during1979-1990
(Phase I), when local governments were the primary enforcer, versus 1991-2015 (Phase
II) when the policy enforcement was delegated to the civilians by incentivizing them to
report their neighbors’ violations of thepolicy, andappointing cluster leaders tomonitor
neighbors. Our identification strategy exploits the exogeneity of the gender of the first-
born child and argues that parents whose firstborn was a girl were more likely to violate
theOCPbecauseof the traditionalChinese “at least one son"preference. Consistentwith
the predictions of the responsibility-shifting theory, we find that parents whoweremore
exposed to the OCP in Phase II currently trust their neighbors less. The OCP exposure
does not undermine trust in local governments. However, parents exposed to the OCP
in Phase I currently trust their local governments less. The OCP exposure does not have
a significant impact on trust in neighbors in Phase I.
2.1 Introduction
In traditional principal-agentmodels, principals are assumed to hire agents because
the agent either owns private information or has a lower opportunity cost. However,
a growing body of experimental literature indicates that the principal-agent relation-
ship might serve to shift responsibility for unpopular actions from the principal to the
agent (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012). In the business sphere, companies use “corpo-
rate downsizing consultants" or “firing consultants" to lay off workers on their behalf so
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that theydonothave to take responsibility. In thepolitical sphere, beginningwithMachi-
avelli, several scholars have proposed that leaders should delegate the enactment of un-
popular measures to agents, thus shifting the responsibilities to them (Fiorina, 1986;
Vaubel, 1986).
Even though responsibility-shifting through delegation has been found to be quite
effective in the lab, field evidence is still missing. In this work, we fill this gap using ev-
idence from China’s one-child policy (OCP), which was a large-scale birth control cam-
paign carried out from 1979 to 2015.
The OCP provides us with an ideal setting to study the effect of delegation in shift-
ing responsibility. The OCP is a highly undesirable policy. In 1979, the median family in
China had 4.5 children. However, under the OCP,most urban couples were only allowed
to have a single child. Violation of the policy led to enormous monetary penalties and
non-monetary consequences. Starting in 1991, the enforcement of the OCP was dele-
gated to civilians through mass mobilization. The 1990 census revealed that the gov-
ernment was far behind the target of limiting the population to 1.2 billion in 2000. In
response, the government began to involve civilians in the enforcement of the policy.
The local authorities created monetary and non-monetary incentives for people to re-
port theirneighbors’ violationsof thepolicy. Grassroots enforcementorganizationswere
established and civilians were appointed to enforce the policy in their neighborhoods.
The effects of delegation cannot be fully understood unless we simultaneously study
what occurs when delegation is not used as a tool for shifting responsibility, which is en-
abledby thefirst phaseof theOCPenforcement. From1979 to 1990, theOCPwasdirectly
enforced by government officials, especially in urban areas. The family planning com-
mission was established in 1981, and its officials were in charge of enforcing the policy.
Our central hypotheses are: first, when the OCP enforcement was delegated to the
civilians in the second phase (1991-2015), parents who were more exposed to the OCP
confronted more intense conflicts with their neighbors and trusted them less as a re-
sult of responsibility attribution. However, the impact on their trust in local govern-
ments is less clear. The local governments could decide the strength of the enforcement
of the OCP and its officials were heavily involved in the enforcement process. Thus, it
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can be assumed that citizens may have had reasons to hold the governments responsi-
ble. The enforcement of the OCP would not affect parents’ trust in local governments
if responsibility-shifting strategies were effective enough. Second, when local govern-
ments were the primary enforcers during the first phase (1979-1990), parents’ trust in
their neighbors should not have been affected as the neighbors were not involved in the
enforcement. However, parents who weremore exposed to the OCP are thought to have
trusted local governments less as they were the sole party to be held responsible.
The strength of the OCP enforcement varied across provinces and time, depending
on local economicconditions, thedemographic setting, andotherpolitical concerns. We
construct an individual-level measure of the OCP exposure in urban areas from 1979 to
2015. In the secondphase,weused theaverage fertilitypenalty rate aperson facedwithin
five years after the arrival of his or her first child as themeasure. The fertility penalty was
the amount of monetary punishment one needed to pay for an above-quota birth. The
fertility penalty not only proxied the strictness of the OCP enforcement as suggested by
the previous literature (Ebenstein, 2010; Huang, Lei and Sun, 2015), but it also positively
correlated with the financial incentives the local governments could provide for the in-
formers. For example, an informer in Chongqing in 2009 could receive 5 percent of the
fertility penalty paid by the victims. We count the penalty rates in the years after the birth
of the first child because citizens were restricted by the OCP only after having their first
child. The five-year interval is selected because, according to the Chinese Census, most
people’s second child arrived within five years after the first child.
The fertility penalty data is largely unavailable for Phase I. Therefore, while keeping
the construction of the OCP exposuremeasure the same, we replace the fertility penalty
with the rate of family planning, which was defined as the percentage of couples who
were of fertility age and had taken birth controlmeasures, like vasoligation, sterilization,
and intrauterine devices (IUDs). In the 1980s, voluntary birth control was quite rare.
Thus, the family planning rates measures how successful the local governments were in
enforcing the OCP. In fact, the family planning rate was one of the main indicators used
by higher-order governments to evaluate the performance of the local birth-planning
commissions.
50
Responsibility is the variable of interest in this study, and trust is our proxy variable
for responsibility. A lower level of trust is a sign of being held responsible. In particular,
we focusoncitizens’ trust in their neighbors and local governments,whicharemeasured
by the 2016 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS-2016).
Themain empirical strategy of the study exploits the exogenous variation in the gen-
der of the first child.1 Given the deep-rooted belief that one family needs at least one son
to maintain the family’s lineage, parents whose firstborn was a girl were more likely to
violate the OCP by trying to have a second child, unlike parents whose firstborn was a
boy. Thus, parents with a firstborn daughter weremore exposed to the OCP.2
Our results are consistent with the predictions of the responsibility-shifting theory.
In Phase I when enforcement of the OCP was delegated, exposure to it leads to a sig-
nificantly larger reduction in trust in neighbors for those whose firstborn child was a
girl than for those whose firstborn was a boy. However, the OCP exposure in this phase
does not undermine trust in local governments. Furthermore, the coefficients on trust
in neighbors are significantly different from coefficients on trust in local governments
at the 5-percent level. On the contrary, in Phase I without delegations parents with a
firstborn girl lose more trust in local governments when facing stronger exposure to the
OCP compared to parents with a firstborn boy. At the same time, the OCP exposure does
not have a significant impact on trust in neighbors in Phase I. Moreover, the coefficients
on trust in local governments are significantly different from the coefficients on trust in
neighbors at the 1-percent level.
We contribute to the lab responsibility-shifting literature by providing, to the best of
our knowledge, the first field evidence (Coffman, 2011; Hamman, Loewenstein andWe-
ber, 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman, 2013). In a typical lab
1Gender of the first child was previously used by Li andWu (2011) to measure the bargaining power of
women within the household, and by Wei and Zhang (2011a) to vary the strength of competitive saving
motive.
2A natural concern, given our identification strategy, is the possibility that the gender of the first child
was not perfectly exogenous due to pervasive sex selection practices, such as selective abortion in China.
However,multiple sources of evidence suggested that sex selection rarely happenedwith the first child (Li,
Yi andZhang, 2011;Wei andZhang, 2011b; Li andWu, 2011). We also directly test the correlations between
the gender of the first child and all the control variables in the empirical analysis (Table 2.3). We do not
find a significant correlation.
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setting, the principal in the control group chooses between a fair allocation and an un-
fair allocation that benefits herself at the cost of a recipient. In the treatment group, an-
other option is added: she can delegate the allocation choice to an agent whose interest
is aligned with hers. The authors find that when the unfair allocation is chosen by the
principal, the recipient who is adversely affected is willing to costly punish the principal
harshly. However, if the task is delegated to the agent and the unfair allocation is chosen,
then the principal receives a much smaller punishment and the agent is punished. In
this paper, we replicate themain results in a large-scale field setting.
By confirming the effectiveness of delegation in responsibility avoidance, this paper
also provides a rationale for mass mobilization. By encouraging people to fight against
each other, governments can avoid the responsibility for implementing an unpopular
policy, a cost they must bear if they need to do all the work themselves. Even though
mass mobilization is widely observed in authoritarian regimes, it has been overlooked
in economics. The only exception is Lichter, Loeffler and Siegloch (2015). Using county-
level data of the number of informers in the 1980s in East Germany, the authors show
that higher levels of government surveillance led to lower levels of political trust in post-
reunification Germany. The key difference is in their scenario, even though the number
of informers was quite large, they were still contracted government employees. The gov-
ernments were still responsible for their actions, while in our setting, the informers were
mobilized civilians.
In a broader context, our findings contribute to the growing literature focusing on
conflict and trust. Nunn andWantchekon (2011) identify a persistent impact of the his-
torical slave trades on current trust levels within Africa. Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti
(2013)documentcausal effectsof ethnic conflicton trust andethnic identityusingmulti-
level data from Uganda. Chen and Yang (2019) study the causal effect of the Great Chi-
nese Famine (1958-1961) on the survivors’ and the subsequent generation’s distrust in
the government. We provide a clear mechanism of the effect of conflict on distrust. We
show how mass mobilization, a measure popular among governments during a social
conflict, affects people’s interpersonal and institutional trust.
Lastly, this study adds to the literature studying the impacts of the OCP. The conse-
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quences of theOCP range fromeconomic growth (Li andZhang, 2007) to sex ratio imbal-
ance (Ebenstein, 2010; Li, Yi and Zhang, 2011), female education (Huang, Lei and Sun,
2015), and to competitive savingmotive (Wei andZhang, 2011a). Weadd to this literature
by showing that the enforcement of the policy incurred a hidden cost to the civil society
by lowering people’s interpersonal trust.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 describes the historical background, in-
stitutional setup, and important features of the OCP. Section 2.3 describes the various
data sources used in this study. Section 2.4 introduces our identification strategy and
empirical model. We present the main results in Section 2.5. We provide a discussion of
alternative explanations in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes and discusses the policy
implication.
2.2 Background of the One-Child Policy
China’s one-child policy is credited with dropping the total fertility rate from 2.81 in
1979 to 1.51 in 2000 (World Bank). The Chinese have long favored large families. To-
tal fertility exceeded six births per mother throughout the 1960s (Banister, 1991). In the
1970s, after two decades of explicit encouragement of population growth, policymakers
in China enacted a series of measures to curb population growth. The OCP was intro-
duced in 1979 and began to be formally phased out in 2015. Under the OCP, most urban
couples were only allowed to have a single child. However, the regulations varied among
regions. Provincial governments localized the state fertility policy due to the diversity of
demographic and socioeconomic conditions across China. As the main instrument for
enforcing the OCP, financial penalties also varied across provinces.
The government employedvariousmethods to enforce theOCP. Parents after thefirst
or second birth were required to have an intrauterine device (IUD) inserted or undergo
sterilization. Thesterilization rate,which isdefinedas thepercentageofwomenof repro-
ductive age who underwent sterilization, increased from 21 to 35 percent between 1979
and 1999 (Scharping, 2013). At times, the government used a more draconian method
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- induced abortions of unauthorized pregnancies - as a “remedial measure making up
for contraceptive failures" (Scharping, 2013). For above-quota births, the government
mainly used fertility penalties to enforce the OCP. Depending on the province of resi-
dence and time period, the fertility penalty for an unauthorized child equaled 10 to 25
percent of a family’s annual income for 7 to 14 years (Serrato, Wang and Zhang, 2016).
In urban areas, other forms of punishments were also widely used. For example, people
employed in urban units were threatened with the denial of health and welfare benefits,
bonus payments, lack of job promotions or even demotions.
From the 1990 census, the central government found a large number of “excess”
births during 1986-1990. In order to achieve the 1.2 billion population limit for the year
2000, the central government began a stricter enforcement of the OCP. In May 1991, the
central government started a “one-vote-down" (yi piao fou jue) campaign. The chief of-
ficials at each administrative levels were made personally responsible for achieving the
birth-control targets. If targets were not achieved, the chief officials were not promoted
while some even lost their jobs. Second, in December 1991, the central government be-
gan to take birth-control performance into the regular performance evaluations of gov-
ernment officials.3 Local authorities increased the grants for the program and gave it
strongerpolitical support. Enforcementof theprogramwasalso strengthened. Thecam-
paigns resulted in a huge jump of penalties for one unauthorized child and were suc-
ceeded by a substantial decline in fertility.
In response to the “excess” births found in the 1990 census, the central government
launched a mass mobilization campaign. This movement was clearly stated by Tieying
Li, who was a member of the Central Politburo of the Communist Party at that time. He
said “No one is allowed to give birth beyond the birth-quota, and let the masses watch
each other,” in an internal speech on April 21, 1990. The rationale for this campaign was
twofold. First, the local cadres lacked the necessary information about who was preg-
nant and whether it was above quota or not. There were not enough local officials to
3The Performance Evaluation System for government officials is an important component of the gov-
ernment personnel management in China. Cadres take the evaluations very seriously. The evaluation re-
sult is one of the most influential factors affecting their career appointments, promotions, transfers, and
removals (Wang, 2013).
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monitor everywomanof childbearing age, and those parentswhoplanned to give unau-
thorized births intentionally hid from them. The government thus relied on people who
were close to the pregnant women to provide the information. Second, there were not
enough local officials to enforce the policy even if information was provided. Enforcing
theOCPwasnotonlyabout sterilizationsand forcedabortions. Thecadresalso launched
propaganda campaigns to promote the idea of one child and carried out the so-called
“Three Examinations,” which checked women for the use of contraceptive rings, preg-
nancy, and illness four times (or more) a year. An expanded crew, with a limited budget,
was needed within a short time frame, which made asking citizens to be “volunteers”
highly attractive.
Twomeasures were taken tomobilize themasses. First, to deal with the information
asymmetry, the citizenswere encouraged and incentivized to report unauthorized preg-
nancies and births of their neighbors, coworkers, and relatives to the authorities. The
incentives provided by the government were mainly monetary.4 The payments varied
across regions and were linked to fertility punishments. For example, in Chongqing in
2009, the informer could be awarded 5percent of the fertility penalty paid by the victims,
which was the equivalent of one-month salary.5 In addition, the informer’s identity was
kept confidential and there was no record of punishments for a false report.
Second, to deal with the ever-increasing workload, more at-will employees and “vol-
unteers” were recruited by the government. They carried out most of the detailed work
instead of government officials. They were generally seen by people as neighbors.
In order to discuss the recruitment and duties of those workers, facts about local
management in urban China are needed. The family-planning commission was the in-
stitute in charge of the enforcement of theOCP. Its lowest level was located in the county
4In somecases, reporting could also lead to career rewards, and failing to report could sometimes cause
collective punishments. The career rewards for denunciation were salient when there were competitions
between colleagues. Public sector employees who were caught violating the OCP would not be promoted
in most cases and might even lose their jobs. When there was a quota for promotions, the hidden career
rewards could be huge. Collective punishments were collected when someone was aware of an OCP vio-
lation but failed to report it. During the years when the OCPwasmost fiercely implemented, one worker’s
violation of theOCP could lead all of her or his coworkers to lose a significant part of their income in some
state-owned enterprises. (http://wap.sciencenet.cn/blogview.aspx?id=749707)
5http://www.chinalawedu.com/lvshi/AAA635949214532/58912.shtm.
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government, which worked with residents’ committees to achieve the birth-planning
targets. The residents’ committee (sometimes also translated as the neighborhood com-
mittee) is the lowest level of urban administration in China. According to the Chinese
constitution, it enjoys a high degree of autonomy and is named the “self-government or-
ganizations of themasses.” It is allowed to recruit at-will employees andpays them inde-
pendently. Although the residents’ committees is formally the lowest organizational en-
tities, there are entities one level below them– the residents’ small groups (juminxiaozu).
Theymay comprise a neighborhood or just an apartment building. The small groups are
a means of an internal organization and do not have a legal status of their own. Their
leaders are called “cluster leaders." They are appointed by the residents’ committee, but
they are not on the government payroll.
Enabledby the revenue collected from the fertility penalty in the 1990s, the residents’
committees recruitedmany at-will full-time and part-time OCP enforcers. For example,
Huangjiapu, a residents’ committee with a population of 500 in Shanxi Province, had 15
full-time at-will employees taskedwith family-planningmatters in its peak (Fong, 2016).
As thosepeoplewerepaidby the residents’ committeesbutnot thehigher authority, they
were not entitled to the social welfare benefits enjoyed by government employees, and
thus were not cadres in people’s eyes. They were often seen as neighbors instead. The
recruitment of the OCP enforcers still failed to solve the labor shortage. Consequently,
the cluster leaders were mobilized to enforce the policy. They were tasked with keeping
track of households’ reproductive habits and reporting those details to the local family-
planning commission. These leaders were also seen as neighbors. In addition to the
cluster leaders, state organizations such as the military, public schools, and hospitals
had their internal family-planning units, as did state-owned enterprises.
These neighborhood-level staffs and cluster leaders were the basic building blocks
of China’s OCPmachinery. According to a report issued by the national family-planning
commission, while there were only half a million full-time employees combined in the
central and local commission, there were about 1.2 million neighborhood-level birth-
planing staff and more than six million cluster leaders who were mobilized to enforce
the OCP (Fong, 2016).
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2.3 Data
To estimate the effect of delegation on trust, we usemeasures of trust from the China
Family Panel Studies (CFPS) and individual-level OCP exposure data from Scharping
(2013) and other sources. The CFPS is a nationally representative panel survey con-
ducted by the Institute of Social Science Survey at Peking University. We introduce our
measurement of different types of trust and exposure to the OCP in section 2.3.1 and
section 2.3.2, respectively.
2.3.1 TheMeasurement of Trust
The primary outcomes of interest are citizens’ trust in neighbors and local govern-
ments, which aremeasured by the CFPS-2016 survey. The questions asked in the survey
are translated as follows: Please rate to what degree you trust your neighbors? Similar
questionswere also asked on trust in local government officials, not in local government
per se. This ensures that when we compare trust in neighbors and trust in local govern-
ments,weare comparing two typesof trust, whoseobjects arebothpeople. In that sense,
we are not comparing people’s trust in two totally different domains. One may also be
concerned with the validity of categorical trust measures. However, Johnson andMislin
(2012) provide experimental evidence that trust, as measured by the World Values Sur-
vey, is positively correlated with experimentally measured trust. The questions asked in
the CFPS are very similar to those in theWorld Values Survey. From the summary statis-
tics (Table 2.1), we can see that people generally trust their neighborsmore than the local
governments.
2.3.2 The Individual-Level OCP Exposure
Our key explanatory variable is an individual-level measure of the exposure to the
OCP: the average fertility penalty an urban resident faced during the five years after the
arrival of his or her first child. More precisely, for an individual i living in urban areas of
province pwhosefirst childwasborn inyear t , hisorherexposure to theOCP ismeasured
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by themean value of the penalty rate in province p from year t +1 to year t +5.
We use provincial fertility penalties for one unauthorized child tomeasure the strict-
ness of the OCP enforcement. As displayed in Figure 2.1, fertility penalties varied across
provinces and across time. At the provincial level, as documented by Scharping (2013),
there were three forms of fertility fines. The first form was a percentage deduction from
thewage over several years. For example, in February 1980, Guangdongprovince ratified
a fine of 10 percent of income from each parent for 14 years for an unsanctioned birth.
The second type of fines was levied as a lump sum payment based on annual income.
For example, Shanghai reported in 1992 that an unauthorized birth carried an immedi-
ate payment of three years of household income. The third form was a certain amount
of immediate payment regardless of household income. For example, from1995 to 2000,
Guangxi ratified the fine as an amount between 2,000 RMB and 50,000 RMB. Following
Ebenstein (2010), we transform all three types of fines into percentages of household in-
come (see Appendix 4.2.1 for more details). Regarding the time trend, fines increased
over time, but the timings of the changes were quite different among provinces. Our
measure of the OCP exposure incorporates both the provincial and time variation.
We improve themeasure of the OCP enforcement in the literature in two ways. First,
wemodify the formula for transforming the fines into percentages of household income
to reflect the rapid and unbalanced growth in Chinese economy in the last 30 years.6 We
also extend the penalty data from 2000 to 2015.
Second, we construct an individual-level measure of the OCP exposure. In our mea-
sure, onlypenalty rates implementedafter parents had their first child count. The reason
is that individuals were restricted by OCP only after having the first child. China Census
data show that the interval between the birth ofmost couples’ first and second childwas
no more than five years (Scharping, 2013). Therefore, the strongest impact of the birth
control policy fell on young couples during the five years following the birth of their first
child. That is why we only count the rates in that 5 years. However, as shown in the next
section, changing the interval to 4 or 6 years does not qualitatively alter our results. This
measure exploits the individual variations in the timing of the first child’s birth. Many
6More details of our calculation are provided in Appendix 4.2.1.
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factors play a role in the timing of having a child. The chance that two women of the
same age give birth to their first child at the same time is low. 7
Sample selection. For our empirical estimation, we limit our sample to individuals
who completed all the CFPS-2010, CFPS-2012, and the CFPS-2016 surveys. We further
limit our sample based on two criteria: (i) individuals that resided in the urban sector,
and (ii) individuals who gave birth to their first child between 1979 and 1985 or between
1991 and 2010.
We restrict our sample to urban households because we do not have a validmeasure
of OCP exposure in rural areas. Compared to urban areas, rural areas are farther away
fromadministrative centers. Itwasmuchharder for thehigher level government tomake
sure that the local cadres closely followed the provincial policy. Furthermore, it was also
difficult for the local cadres to collect information on the households’ annual income, on
which the fertility penalty was based and calculated. In practice, the fertility penalty was
often set to be the same for all households in the same village for the sake of lacking in-
formation. Additionally, some low-income families couldnot afford themassive amount
of penalties. In urban areas, this was not a problem as the penalties could be collected
on a monthly basis and be directly deducted from the salary. However, the cash flow of
the rural residents was not as stable as that of their urban counterparts. Rural cadres of-
ten chose to collect asmuch as the low-income family could afford on a lump-sumbasis.
Hence, there was a lot of randomness in the enforcement of the OCP in rural areas.
For criteria (ii), the reasonwechoose to look at peoplewhogavebirth to thefirst child
after 1979 is it is the year theOCP started. We restrict our sample to individuals who gave
birth to their first childbefore 2010because theOCPwas formallyphasedout in 2015. We
exclude people who gave birth to the first child after 2010 from our sample as they only
experienced OCP during part of the five-year interval after the birth of their first child.
For a similar reason, we exclude people whose first child arrived between 1986 and 1990
7Onemayworry about the possibility that parents rationally choose the timing of the first birth to enjoy
looser OCP enforcement. However, that is unlikely for two reasons. First, the provincial OCP enforcement
policy wasmainly made by the provincial government and was highly unpredictable for people without a
special connection to theprovincial government. Second, to choose a looserOCPenforcement, onewould
need to plan the timing of having the first child, the timing of the second, and foresee the enforcement
strength for several years. Even if it could be done, it might be too costly to implement.
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as we cannot tell whether they experienced Phase I OCP or Phase II OCP.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Identification Strategy
Ourmain identification strategy exploits the exogenous variation in the gender of the
first child. A deep-rooted belief in the Chinese culture is that each family needs at least
one son tomaintain the lineage. Consequently, urban coupleswhose first childwas a girl
were more likely to violate the OCP by trying to have a second child than parents whose
first child was a boy. If so, they were more exposed to the OCP penalties. To validate our
empirical strategy, we provide evidence that the gender of the first child is truly exoge-
nous. We then show that the propensity to give birth to a second childwas higher among
couples whose first child was a girl.
One potential concern is that the gender of the first child is not exogenous because
sex selectionwas awidespread practice inChina. However, therewere few sex selections
performed for the first child. Sex selection practices can be performed either prenatally
(sex selective abortion) or postnatally (for example, female infanticide). The bulk of sex
selections in China took place prenatally as the accessibility of sex-selective technology
improved (e.g., Edlund, 1999; Das Gupta, Jiang, Li, Xie, Woojin and Bae, 2003). Chen, Li
and Meng (2013) provide evidence of few sex-selective abortions on the firstborn child
using data from the Chinese Children Survey. They show that for first pregnancies, the
sex ratio at birth (males/females) was close to being natural.8 In some years, it was close
8According to (Wilson and Hardy, 2002), the natural sex ratio at birth is estimated at 106 boys to 100
girls. A range of natural and environmental factorsmay affect the natural sex ratio. For example, Mathews
et al. (2005) provide extensive evidence to show that the following factors are relevant. Thefirst factor is the
age of themother: mothers aged 25 to 35 had babies with a sex ration of 1.05 on average. But the sex ratio
ranged between 0.94 and 1.11 formothers who were below the age of 15 or above 40. The race was also an
important factor: the ratio was 1.05 for the white non-Hispanic population, 1.04 for Mexican Americans,
1.03 for African Americans and Indians. It is the highest (1.07) for mothers of Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese,
Cuban, and Japanese ethnicity. The maximum value went as high as 1.14 over the 62-year study period.
However, for the results on racial differences, whether those differences were purely driven by nature or
whether social factors also played a role is still an open question.
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to the averagenatural rate of 1.06 andwasneverhigher than1.14. Moreover, the abortion
ratio (the number of abortions/number of children born) was smaller than 0.05 percent
for the firstborn child. The positive correlation between sex ratio and abortion rate was
drivenmostly by second and higher order pregnancies.
Our statement that the gender of the first child is exogenous is confirmed and com-
plemented by the nationwide census data of China in 1990, 2000, and 2005.9 As docu-
mented in Table 2.2, the ratio of boys and girls for the firstborn child was also close to
being natural. More specifically, the male/female sex ratios were 1.052, 1.071, and 1.024
in the three waves of the census.
To further check whether the gender of the first child is truly exogenous, we run a re-
gression of the gender of the first child on all other control variables that are used later in
the empirical analysis. Table 2.3 reports the results using both a linear probabilitymodel
and a probit model. People did not endogenously choose the gender of the first child
based on the fertility penalties in previous years. Also, none of the other control vari-
ables is statistically significant in explaining the gender of the first child.
The exogenously determined gender of the first child affects Chinese parents’ later
childbearing behaviors. Here, we define the “at least one son preference" as always pre-
ferring to have a new child when there is no boy in the children profile. This specific
definition of “son preference" indicates that people whose first child was a girl are more
likely to try to have a second child than people with a firstborn boy. Even though trying
to havemore than one child could lead toOCPpenalties, for some, the potential benefits
of having a son outweighed the cost for some. However, for people whose first child was
a boy, the potential benefits of an additional child vastly diminishes and they may find
it too costly to violate the OCP. Therefore, we should expect parents whose first child is a
girl to bemore exposed to the OCP.
This “at least one son" belief is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. Confucianism, as
the “state religion" in ancient China, is still strongly influencing the Chinese people in
9Since there is no information on children who moved out of home, we limit the sample to mothers
and children who are mostly likely to be living in the same household. More specifically, we restrict our
sample to married women aged 21-40 who had their first child after the one-child policy was introduced.
We further restrict their matched children aged between 0 and 18.
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modern times. In Confucian philosophy, filial piety is one of the four virtues. Itmeans to
be good to one’s parents, which requires ensuring male heirs. Mencius or Mengzi, who
is themost famousConfucian after Confucius himself, once said: “There are three forms
of unfiliality, and bearing no heirs is the worst" (Chan, 2002).
Evidence from census data suggests that the “at least one son" preference was quite
persistent in modern China. Table 2.2 illustrates the probabilities of having more than
one child after having either a firstborn boy or a firstborn girl using census data. It sug-
gests that, for instance, 49 percent of those with a firstborn daughter hadmore than one
child, while for thosewith a firstborn son the numberwas 36 percent in the 2000 census.
We consider this gap to be large as people who were not affected by the OCP were also
included in the census.
2.4.2 Empirical Specification
Let i index individuals, c index birth cohorts, and p index provinces. We model an
outcome of interest yi cp , which could be trust in neighbors or local governments. Our
key independent variable of interest is 1stChi ldpenal t y1−5i cp , which we define as the five-
yearmeanvalueof thepenalty rates inprovincepafter individual i hadhis/herfirst child.
yi cp =
∑
c
αc +
∑
p
δp +β01stChi ldpenal t y1−5i cp +X′i cpγ+β11stChi ldGir li cp∑
c
αc ×1stChi ldGir li cp +
∑
p
δp ×1stChi ldGir li cp +X′i cpγ×1stChi ldGir li cp
+β21stChi ldpenal t y1−5i cp ×1stChi ldGir li cp +²i cp
(2.1)
where 1stChi ldGir li cp is the dummy variable for the gender of the first child.
1stChi ldGir li cp is equal to 1 if individual i’s first child was a girl. β0 captures the effect
of OCP exposure on trust for individuals whose first child was a boy. The main coeffi-
cient of interest is β2, which captures the differential impact of OCP exposure on trust
of people with a firstborn girl and trust of people with a firstborn boy. X′i cp is a vector of
observable characteristics for individual i of birth cohort c in province p. Here, we in-
clude income and education attainment level. αc and δp are full sets of birth cohort and
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province of current residencefixed effects. By conditioning onprovince fixed effects, our
empirical specificationabsorbs all time-invariantprovince-specific trust characteristics.
By conditioning on cohort fixed effects, we can difference out cross-cohort changes in
trust that would occur even in the absence of OCP. Lastly, ²i cp is the error term. We clus-
ter our standard errors at the province level to allow for correlation over time within a
province. Due to the smaller number of clusters in this case (25), we implement a wild
cluster bootstrap-t procedure (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008) for improved infer-
ence. We also present the corresponding p-values in our tables.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 The Effect of OCP Exposure between 1991 and 2015 on Trust
In Table 2.4, we present the regression estimates from equation 2.1 on the two trust
outcomes: trust in neighbors and trust in local governments. In columns 1 and 3, we
present the baseline estimates using a parsimonious specification that includes only
province and birth cohort fixed effects. We add individual-level controls as our preferred
specification from equation 2.1, including education attainment and family income per
capita. Columns 2 and 4 indicate that our results are consistent across different specifi-
cations. The remaining discussion focuses on our preferred specification.
Regarding trust in neighbors (column 1), the OCP exposure significantly lowers trust
in neighbors for couples whose first child was a girl, but not for couples whose first child
was a boy. The estimated differences between the two groups (β2), are significantly dif-
ferent from 0 at the 1 percent level and economically large. As the gender of the first
child is arguably exogenous, this result suggests that the effect we find is causal. The pa-
rameter estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in theOCPexposure is
associatedwith 0.244 standard deviationmore reduction in trust in neighbors for people
whose first child is a girl than for people whose first child was a boy.
Next, we proceed to examine whether the OCP exposure affects people’s political
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trust. Due to the political sensitivity of eliciting trust in the central government inmain-
land China, we are only able to measure citizens’ trust in local governments explicitly.
Columns 3-4 of Table 2.4 present the corresponding estimation results. One can see that
there is no significant impact of OCP exposure on trust in local governments regardless
of the gender of the first child. Also, there is no significant difference between the two
groups of people. The estimate of coefficient β2 is small and not significantly different
from 0. This finding is particularly striking because people blame their neighbors for
turning them in, but they do not blame the governments who initiated the harm. One
can also see that our results are consistent if we use wild bootstrap p-value.10
2.5.2 The Effect of OCP Exposure in the 1980s on Trust
In the previous section, we showed that when the OCP enforcement was delegated,
more severe enforcement significantly undermined people’s trust in neighbors but not
trust in local governments. Nevertheless, another question arises: if local governments
enforced the policy by themselves instead of delegating it to the neighbors, would the
people blame local governments but not the neighbors? The early ages of the OCP en-
forcement enablesus to study this possibility. Thepolicy came into effect in 1979, but the
masseswere notmobilized until 1991. Thus, parents whose first childwas born between
1979 and 1990 were exposed to the OCP but were not hurt by their neighbors. Looking
into their trust in local governments and neighbors can help us answer the above ques-
tion.
Ideally, we want to keep our analysis consistent and use the fertility penalty to mea-
sure OCP severity. However, 11 out of 31 provinces had not established their fertility
penalty policies in 1984. Some provinces introduced their first fertility penalties in 1988.
We use the family-planning rate instead as the measure of the OCP severity in this pe-
riod. The rate of family-planning is the percentage of couples who are in fertility age and
have taken birth-control measures such as sterilization, IUDs, and birth-control pills.
Voluntary birth control was quite rare in the 1980s; the family-planning rates measured
10We conduct a triple-difference analysis to further show that the effects of OCP exposure on trust in
neighbors and trust in local governments are significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level.
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how successful the local governments were at enforcing the OCP. It was one of the main
indicators used to evaluate the performance of the local family-planing commissions.
One limitation of this approach is that the local governments have strong incentives
to over-report the family-planning rate in order to achieve its birth-control targets. How-
ever, as long as the degree of over-reporting is the same across province and time (which
is likely as local cadres faced similar incentiveswhen reporting the family-planning rate),
our measure of the OCP exposure is still valid. Even if this assumption fails to hold, the
degree of over-reporting is still orthogonal to the gender of the first child and thus our
identification strategy can handle this problem.
Consistent with our individual-level measure of the OCP exposure, we use the five-
year average family-planning rate an urban resident experienced during the five years
after the arrival of his/her first child. More precisely, for an individual i living in urban
areas of province p whose first child was born in year t , his/her exposure to OCP ismea-
sured by the five-year average family-planning rate in province p from year t +1 to year
t+5. To further validate the family-planning ratemeasure,wecross-check thecorrelation
between fertility penalties and the family-planning ratewhenbothhavedata in the same
year, the twomeasures are significantly correlated at the 5 percent level (Table 4.13).
We can see from Table 2.5 that when the policy was solely implemented by govern-
ment officials during the 1980s, the results are quite the opposite: citizens blame local
governments, but not neighbors. For people whose first child was a girl, a one standard
deviation increase in family-planning rates leads to a 0.38 standard deviation more de-
crease in trust in local governments relative to people whose first child was a boy. The
estimates for the difference between the two groups of people (β2) are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. In contrast to the results on people’s trust in local gov-
ernments, OCP exposure has no significant impact on trust in neighbors regardless of
the gender of the first child and the difference between the two groups of people is not
significant.11
11Using a triple-difference analysis, we show that the effects of OCP exposure on trust in neighbors and
trust in local governments are significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level.
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2.5.3 Mechanism
One important concern is the question of whether our results are driven by system-
atic differencesbetweencoupleswhosefirst childwas a girl and coupleswhosefirst child
was a boy beyond the OCP exposure.
Todistinguishbetween the twoexplanations,we lookat thedifferencesbetweenpeo-
ple who only had one child and people who had more than one child. If the difference
between people whose firstborn was a boy and people whose firstborn was a girl is in-
deed the difference in OCP exposure, then we should expect that for people who had
more than one child the differential effect of OCP on trust should disappear. The reason
is that urban couples who had more than one child, regardless of the gender of the first
child, all violated theOCP. Thus their exposure to theOCPwas the same regardless of the
gender of the first child. However, if the differential effect of OCP exposure on trust are
driven by other systematic differences between the two groups, then we should expect
the results not to be affected by howmany children they had.
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 show that our results are driven by people who had only one
child. In both Phase I and Phase II, our results remain consistent if we restrict our sam-
ple to those who only had one child. However, there’s no significant difference in trust
in neighbors or local governments between people whose first child was a daughter and
people whose first child was a son if they hadmore than one child. This result is consis-
tent with our hypothesis but not with other explanations of our main results.
2.5.4 Robustness Checks
One potential problem of our work is that the gender of the first child is not perfectly
exogenous. We argue that, if anything, such selections are likely to work against the re-
sults we find. Here, the couples whose first child is a girl are the treatment group and the
coupleswhosefirst child is a boy are the control group. Due to the sex selections favoring
boys, some couples who are in the treatment group aremistakenly identified as the con-
trol group, whichmakes it harder for us to observe a difference between the two groups.
Furthermore, Table 4.4 lists the number of male and female first births across provinces
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from June 1999 to June 2000 in urban areas according to the 2000 census. Since the sam-
ple sizes are too small to calculate a precise sex ratio, we construct a one-tailed t-statistic
to test whether the calculated sex ratio (column 4) is statistically different from the bi-
ological sex ratio12. We find that six provinces’ sex ratios at first birth are significantly
higher than the normal sex ratio at the 5 percent level: Beijing, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei,
Guangdong, andGuangxi. To further validate our results, we drop observations from the
six provinces and replicate the specifications in Table 2.4. Estimation results, reported in
Table 4.5, indicate that dropping them does not affect our findings.
Although we have argued that it is unlikely for parents to endogenously choose the
timingof thefirst birth toenjoy looserOCPenforcement,weperformanother robustness
check using an alternativemeasure of the OCP exposure: theminimumpenalty (family-
planning rate) in the five years after people had their first child after 1991 (before 1991).
We re-estimate our baseline equation with the alternative measures of OCP exposure.
The results are unaffected (Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 in Appendix).
We next examine the robustness of the OCP exposure measure. Recall that we used
the five-year average fertility penalties (or family-planning rates) after people had their
first child. Our results are quite consistent when we use a four-year (Table 4.8 and Table
4.10) or six-year (Table 4.9 and Table 4.11) average fertility penalties (or family-planning
rates).
2.6 Discussions
We showed when the enforcement of the OCP, an extremely unpopular policy, was
delegated to civilians, there was a significant decline in people’s trust in their neighbors
butnot in their trust in local governments. However,whengovernmentofficials enforced
the OCP, people’s trust in government was undermined. The results are consistent with
the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation. In this section, we address whether we
can attribute the results to the delegation. In what follows, we explore three alternative
12Appendix 4.2.2 further shows the detailed construction of the one-tailed t-statistic.
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interpretations of our results: the local governments are held responsible in the second
phase but people are unwilling or dare not report their mistrust; people do not blame
the local governments but they do blame the central government in the second phase;
or the local governments in the second phase performed better than the governments in
the first phase and their good performance canceled out the responsibility.
2.6.1 Dare Not To Report Mistrust
An important concern regarding the absence of a significant impact ofOCP exposure
on trust in local governments in the second phase is that people try to express politically
correct views. To address this possibility, we present the distributions of responses to the
question of trust in local governments (Table 4.12) in this period. From the broad range
of answers to the question, an indication is that respondents are likely not attempting to
provide “correct" responses. If there is such a “correct" response, then onewould expect
that 10 is the correct value. However, in fact, people’s trust in local governments is not
abnormally high. Themean value is smaller than themean value of trust in neighbors in
our sample.
Also, we find a significant negative impact of OCP exposure on trust in local govern-
ments in Phase Iwhengovernment officialswere in charge of enforcing thepolicy, which
further suggests respondents are willing to report their mistrust in local governments.
Thus it is unlikely that people’s fear to report mistrust in local governments drives our
Phase II results.
2.6.2 Trust in Central Government
The second concern about our estimates is that people do not hold the local gov-
ernments responsible in the second phase because people treat the local government as
merely the policy enforcer, not the policymaker. So it is important to see whether there
is any effect on trust in the central government in Phase II. Due to the political sensi-
tivity of eliciting trust in the central government in mainland China, we are only able to
measure trust in local governments. Even though we can potentially use trust in local
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governments to cautiously extrapolate trust in the central government (Cantoni, Chen,
Yang, YuchtmanandZhang, 2017), onemightwonder howbig the correlation is between
the two trust measures. As an additional check, we construct two proxies for trust in the
central government as the dependent variables.
The first proxy for trust in the central government is an indicator variable where 1
represents the individual is/was a member of the Communist Party. Choosing to join
the Communist Party per se reflects one’s political attitude and belief.13 The second
proxy is the difference between the number of days accessing political news through
television and the number of days accessing political news through the Internet. It is
a well-established fact that all television broadcasters in China are the “mouthpiece" of
the Party (Zhao, 1998; Shirk, 2011). While Internet censorship ismuch looser thanmedia
censorship, Internet censors focus their attention on silencing speech thatmay generate
collective action, rather than criticism of the government (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013).
Moreover, Internet users can browse international news channels that are not provided
on television. So if one does not trust the central government, she is more motivated to
access the political news from a less censored media source - the Internet. We calcu-
late the difference in the media source to get rid of the variation in howmuch one cares
about political news. The bigger the difference, the higher the level of trust in the central
government.
From Table 2.8 across all columns, we do not find any significant difference in the
impact of the OCP exposure on trust in the central government between people whose
first child was a girl and people whose first child was a boy. This suggests that people
not only do not blame the local governments, but they also do not blame the central
government either.
13Thismeasurecertainlyhas its shortcomings. One issue is thatpeoplemaychoose tobecomeamember
of the Communist Party simply due to career concerns. Another concern is that people may lose their
party membership due to violations of the OCP, which can also explain a negative correlation between
OCP exposure and the probability of being a party member.
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2.6.3 Better Performance in the Second Phase
A third concern is that even thoughwefind that there ismore reduction in trust in lo-
cal governments when the OCPwas enforcedmore strictly in the first phase and there is
no sucheffect in the secondphase, thedifferencecanbeattributed toother factors rather
than delegation. One potential factor is the performance of the government. It could be
that the governments in the second phase performed better regarding economic devel-
opment or public goods provision, and that is why people do not attribute responsibility
to them. However, for this story to explain our results, it must be that the performance
of the local governments is associated with the fertility penalty, which is our main mea-
sure of OCP exposure. As shown in Table 2.9, we did not find any significant correlation
between the fertility penalty andmeasures of government performance, including GDP
per capita, urbanization rate, and public expenditure.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides field evidence on responsibility avoidance through delegation
using evidence from China’s one-child policy. Consistent with the predictions of the
responsibility-shifting theory,wefind thatwhen local governmentswere theprimary en-
forcer of thepolicy inPhase I, parents strongly exposed to theOCPcurrently trusted their
local governments less. The OCP exposure did not undermine trust in neighbors in this
phase as expected. However, when the local governments delegated the enforcement of
the policy to civilians in Phase II, parents who were more exposed to the OCP currently
trust their neighbors less. Wedonot findany significant impact ofOCPexposure on trust
in local governments among people who experienced the Phase II OCP. The differences
in results between the two phases imply that responsibility avoidance through delega-
tion is effectivenot only in the lab, as shownbyprevious studies, but alsoona large-scale,
highly influential field setting.
Authoritarian governments frequently mobilize the masses to enforce unpopular
70
policies. Civilians are encouraged and incentivized to report their neighbors, friends,
and co-workers to the authority. For example, during Stalin’s Great Purge, civilians were
often sent to the Gulag as a result of reports initiated by friends and neighbors (Fitz-
patrick, 1999). In Nazi Germany, homemakers, dentists, and other average citizens
turned in their Jewish neighbors after petty neighborhood quarrels (Johnson, 2000). In a
recent episode, the President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, encouraged vigilantes
among the general population to commit violence against suspected drug users in his
brutal drug war. In addition to grassroots information collection and shortage of police
force, our findings provide another rationale for mass mobilization’s popularity among
the (authoritarian) governments - it helps the governments avoid part of the responsi-
bility of implementing an unpopular policy.
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income after being caught violating the OCP. Data source: Scharping (2013) and authors’
calculation.
Figure 2.1: Provincial Fertility Penalties in Urban China
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Sd
1991-2010
Trust in neighborsa 1897 6.407 2.065
Trust in local governmentsa 1897 4.304 2.47
OCP exposure 1897 3.387 2.093
Age in 2016 1897 42.78 6.002
Family income per capita 1897 9.746 .867
Education attainment 1897 3.618 1.303
1979-1985
Trust in neighborsa 822 6.582 2.072
Trust in local governmentsa 822 4.957 2.502
Birth control rate 822 89.164 3.101
Number of female at fertility age (000s) 822 78.33 39.37
Age in 2016 822 59.78 3.683
Family income per capita (in thousands) 822 27.71 34.79
Education attainment 822 2.94 1.168
a: categorical variables: 0 = extremely low trust;10 = extremely high trust
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Table 2.2: Fertility Patterns in China
Share of families havingmore than one child Sex ratio of
Firstborn: boy Firstborn: girl first birth
1990 0.479 0.538 1.052
2000 0.358 0.493 1.071
2005 0.285 0.418 1.024
Notes: Data is fromChinaCensus 1% sample (1990), 0.95% sample (2000), 1%
sample (2005). We restrict our sample to married women who had their first
child after 1979 and whose ages were between 21 and 40 in the census. We
also restrict their matched children to those who aged between 0 and 18 in
the census.
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Table 2.3: Factors that Predict Gender of the First Child
Dependent variable Having a first-born daughter
Probit Probit Linear prob.
(1) (2) (3)
OCP exposure 0.024 0.017 0.007
(0.032) (0.039) (0.015)
Age -0.002 -0.001
(0.008) (0.003)
Log (income) -0.029 -0.011
(0.027) (0.010)
Years of education 0.010 0.004
(0.007) (0.003)
Province FE Y Y Y
Observations 1,726 1,726 1,726
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table presents estimates
of howobservable characteristics predict the gender of thefirst
child. Thedependent variable iswhether the first child is a girl.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase II
(1991-2010)
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure 0.045 0.033 -0.041 -0.053
(0.064) (0.061) (0.080) (0.085)
Firstborn daughter -0.282*** -0.275*** -0.074 -0.073
×OCP exposure (0.086) (0.087) (0.156) (0.163)
p-Value [0.003] [0.004] [0.639] [0.656]
Bootstrap p-value [0.004] [0.004] [0.684] [0.724]
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.407 6.407 4.304 4.304
Std.Dev.DV 2.065 2.065 2.470 2.470
Observations 1,897 1,897 1,897 1,897
R-squared 0.089 0.098 0.078 0.088
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure in phase II is defined as
the five-yearmean value of the fertility penalty rates in province p after indi-
vidual i had his/her first child. All regressions include a full set of province
and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are standard errors clustered by
province. We use a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure that are clustered at
the province level for improved inference with a small number of clusters
(Cameron, Gelbach andMiller, 2008). We report the corresponding p-values
in brackets. We also report the p-values for OLSwith clustered data. Number
of clusters: 25.
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Table 2.5: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase I
(1979-1985)
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure 0.100 0.086 0.109 0.098
(0.082) (0.081) (0.085) (0.075)
Firstborn daughter -0.067 -0.037 -0.338*** -0.337***
×OCP exposure (0.087) (0.084) (0.074) (0.082)
p-Value [0.449] [0.667] [0.000] [0.000]
Bootstrap p-Value [0.552] [0.688] [0.004] [0.004]
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.582 6.582 4.957 4.957
Std.Dev.DV 2.072 2.072 2.502 2.502
Observations 822 822 822 822
R-squared 0.142 0.155 0.140 0.156
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure in phase I is de-
fined as the five-year average family-planning rate in province p after an
urban resident had his/her first child. All regressions include a full set
of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are standard errors
clustered by province. We use a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure that
are clustered at the province level for improved inference with a small
number of clusters (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008). We report the
corresponding p-values in brackets. We also report the p-values for OLS
with clustered data. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneous Effect of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase II
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
One child ≥ Two children One child ≥ Two children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure 0.039 0.006 -0.114 -0.206
(0.073) (0.308) (0.085) (0.386)
Firstborn daughter -0.258*** 0.151 0.043 -0.306
×OCP exposure (0.079) (0.384) (0.173) (0.505)
Mean DV 6.370 6.558 4.227 4.621
Std.Dev. DV 2.067 2.058 2.454 2.509
Observations 1,516 380 1,516 380
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure in phase II is defined as the five-yearmean
value of the fertility penalty rates in province p after individual i had his/her first child. The
sample in columns (1) and (3) is parents who have a single child. The sample in columns (2)
and (4) is parents who have at least two children. All regressions include a full set of province
and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are standard errors clustered by province. Number of
clusters: 25.
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneous Effect of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase I
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
One child ≥ Two children One child ≥ Two children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure 0.016 0.228** 0.036 0.425
(0.107) (0.106) (0.057) (0.268)
Firstborn daughter 0.001 0.072 -0.411*** -0.084
×OCP exposure (0.151) (0.131) (0.110) (0.323)
Mean DV 6.439 6.783 4.802 5.176
Std.Dev. DV 2.111 2.003 2.475 2.527
Observations 481 341 481 341
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure in phase I is defined as the five-year aver-
age family-planning rate in province p after individual i had his/her first child. All regressions
include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. The sample in columns (1) and (3) is par-
entswhohave a single child. The sample in columns (2) and (4) is parentswhohave at least two
children. All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses
are standard errors clustered by province. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 2.8: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Central
Government
Dependent variable: Party membership Media source
for political news
(1) (2)
OCP exposure 0.004 -0.367***
(0.009) (0.112)
Firstborn daughter 0.007 0.147
×OCP exposure (0.017) (0.158)
Mean DV 0.112 -1.506
Std.Dev.DV 0.316 3.440
Observations 1,897 1,386
R-squared 0.195 0.122
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include a full set of
province and cohort fixed effects. The dependent variable in column (1)
is whether the individual is/was amember of the Communist Party. The
dependent variable in column (2) is the difference between the number
of days accessing political news through television and the number of
days accessing political news through the Internet. All regressions in-
clude a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are
standard errors clustered by province. Number of clusters: 19.
80
Table 2.9: Correlation between Fertility Penalty
and Government Performance
Dependent variable: Fertility penalty
ln (GDP per capita) 0.409
(1.609)
Urbanization rate -0.800
(0.994)
Share of public expenditure 1.170
(1.356)
Mean DV 2.600
Std.Dev. DV 2.071
Observations 534
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The regression
includes year fixed effects. Urbanization rate is de-
fined as the share of urban population. The share of
public expenditure is defined as the share of govern-
ment expenditure on culture, education, health, etc.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of
clusters:25.
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3.0 Correspondence Bias
Whendrawing inferences about a person’s enduring characteristics fromher actions,
correspondence bias is the tendency to overly emphasize the role of the person’s en-
during characteristics and underestimate the influence of transient situational factors.
Focusing on incentives as one important situational factor, we build a simple model to
formalize correspondence bias, and we test predictions of the model in an online ex-
periment. We randomly assign some subjects to play a ‘benign’ game that encourages
cooperation and other subjects to play a ‘malign’ game that encourages selfish behavior.
Everyone thenneeds to choosewhether to take the dictator-gamegivings fromanearlier
stage of the experiment of a benign or malign game player. Consistent with correspon-
dence bias, subjects are on average willing to pay to be matched with a benign-game
player, an effect driven by both over-estimation of the prosociality of the benign-game
player and under-estimation of the prosociality of the malign-game player. We show,
further, that experiencing both games oneself, as opposed to only observing them, and
receiving information about how each of the players behaved in both games, eliminates
the effect.
3.1 Introduction
When drawing inferences about a person’s enduring characteristics from their be-
haviors, the correspondence bias (Jones andHarris, 1967; Ross, 1977;Gilbert andMalone,
1995) is the tendency to overly emphasize the role of the person’s characteristics and un-
derestimate the impact of the incentives they face. For example, a common belief is that
the rich are more selfish than the poor. They avoid taxes more often than others (Cox,
1984; Christian, 1994; Wang andMurnighan, 2014), and they break traffic laws more of-
ten when driving (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton and Keltner, 2012). However,
thedifferences inbehaviors canbe fully explainedbydifferences in incentives (Andreoni,
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Nikiforakis andStoop, 2017). The richhavemore sources of income,which enables them
to hide part of it, and paying traffic tickets is less painful for them due to diminishing
marginal utility of money. The rich and the poor may actually be similarly generous, as
shown beautifully by Andreoni, Nikiforakis and Stoop (2017), but people still attribute
their selfish behaviors to their dispositions. Another good example is that voters often
reward and punish incumbent presidents, governors, and senators for events that are
completely beyond their control. Wolfers (2002) finds that voters in oil-producing states
base voting decisions on the international price of oil, which should be beyond any gov-
ernor’s control.
Correspondence bias, which was previously overlooked by economists, has impor-
tant implications for everyday life. Consider two regions (countries, neighborhoods,
etc.) or ethnic groups where social norms (or institutions) are starkly different. Person
A is from region/group 1where unethical behaviors are harshly punished, and everyone
finds it optimal to be trustworthy. Person B is from region/group 2 where legal enforce-
ment is weak, and sabotaging others is common. NowapersonCneeds to choose one of
the two to work with or hire. She observes that A behavedmore reliably in the past than
personB. If she is correspondence-biased, then shemay jump to the conclusion that A is
more trustworthy thanB, and chooseAover B even if B is a bettermatch in other aspects.
We build a simplemodel to formalize the idea of correspondence bias. In ourmodel,
an individual chooses between two players after observing their actions, and the goal
is to choose the one who is more likely to be the Good type. One player plays the be-
nign game in which both the Good type and the Bad type choose to cooperate, while the
other player plays themalign game in which the Good type cooperates and the Bad type
defects. Borrowing the idea of cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005), we model
correspondence bias as the tendency to underestimate the correlations between actions
and the game structure when interpreting the signals. Consequently, the biased indi-
vidual tends to over-interpret cooperation in the benign game as a signal for the Good
type and under-interpret cooperation in the malign game as a signal for the Good type.
Even though the game one plays is completely determined by chance, we predict that a
correspondence-biased individual is more likely to choose the benign-game player.
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There are several challenges to empirically identify correspondence bias. Imagine
an experiment in whichwe randomly assign half of the subjects to play the benign game
that incentivizes everyone to cooperate, and the other half to play themalign game that
incentivizes some people to defect. We then let them choose between a benign-game
player and amalign-game player to play a follow-up game together. Ourmodel predicts
that on average people are more willing to pick the former. The first challenge is to dis-
tinguish between correspondence bias and Bayesian updating. Choosing the benign-
game player can be consistent with Bayesian updating, as someone who chooses to co-
operate in the benign game can rationally be expected to bemore pro-social than some-
one who chooses to defect in the malign game. Second, reciprocity can also motivate
choosing thebenigngameplayer. Participantsmaywant to reciprocate thebenign-game
player’s cooperative behavior in the follow-up game. Third, if one believes that people
becomemore (less) pro-social under good (bad) institutions, as shown in (Peysakhovich
and Rand, 2015; Cason, Lau and Mui, 2019), then it can make sense to choose the indi-
vidual who played the benign game.
We deal with the three potential confounds using a three-stage experimental design.
In the first stage, all subjects make a decision as the dictator in the dictator game. At the
second stage, they are randomly matched into groups of four to play the benign game
and the malign game. Both games are 2x2 complete-information games with a unique
equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies. The malign game is the prisoners’ dilemma
game, while the benign game is the Harmony Game (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster, 2018)
where the dominate strategy is to cooperate. At the end of the second stage, subjects
are able to see the actions of a benign-game player and a malign-game player. In the
third stage, they choosewhether to be awarded the amount given in the first stage dicta-
tor game either from the benign-game player or themalign-game player, both of whose
stage 2 actions are known to them. We use a multiple price list to elicit their willingness
to pay for their preferred player.
We address the Bayesian updating confound by randomly assigning the players to
the two games. The randomization ensures that the benign-game player and malign-
game players are equally likely to be the Good type ex ante. The Martingale prop-
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erty of Bayesian beliefs then implies that the expected posterior beliefs are the same.
Therefore, a Bayesian model predicts that the individual will be indfferent between re-
ceiving the dictator offerings of the two players. However, our model predicts that a
correspondence-biased individual is more likely to choose the benign-game player over
themalign gameplayer. Our design avoids thepossibility that reciprocity could drive the
results by using a dictator game in which there are no actions that the receiver can take;
thus, there is no way to reciprocate the benign-game player’s cooperation in the follow-
up game. Finally, we avoid the potential for participation in one game or the other to
shape the player’s prosociality by sequencing the dictator decision so it occurs before
stage 2. Even if individuals become more pro-social after playing the benign game, the
dictator decision will have already been made in stage 1, and cannot be altered by the
game.
To better understand correspondence bias, and to explore potential methods to re-
duce it, we utilize a 4-treatment design. The treatments differ in how many games one
plays, and howmuch information one gets. In treatment 1, subjects only play one game,
and are completely unaware of the other game. In stage 3, they are asked to choose be-
tween a benign/malign-game partner and a stranger. In treatment 2, subjects still only
play one game as in treatment 1, but those who played the benign (malign) game also
learn about the action of a malign-game (benign-game) player at the end of stage 2. In
this treatment they are informedof the gameplayedby themalign-gameplayer, but they
do not experience the game themselves. In stage 3 they choose between a benign-game
player and amalign-game player given information about both players’ actions in stage
2. In treatment 3, subjects play both games simultaneously in stage 2, and choose be-
tween their benign-gamepartner andmalign-gamepartner in stage 3. Thus, not only do
they experience the malign game themselves, but they actually play it with the malign-
game player they have the option to choose in stage 3. The setup of Treatment 4 is the
same as treatment 3, with the exception that subjects are also informed of both of their
partners’ actions in the other game (benign for the malign game partner andmalign for
the benign game partner) that each of their partners play with someone else.
Our results show, first, that correspondence bias exists and influences stage 3 de-
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cisions. We measure the impact of correspondence bias through the benign premium
– the amount a player, in stage 3, is willing to pay to receive the dictator game offer-
ing of the benign-game player, which they decided upon in stage 1. While the rational
Bayesian model predicts the average benign-premium to be 0, we find that the benign
premium is 12.48 cents on average in Treatment 2, the baseline treatment. It is signifi-
cantly different from 0 at the 1% level. It means subjects are willing to pay 12.48 to get
the benign-gameplayer’s dictator transfers out of 100, the largest possible difference be-
tween the two potential dictators. Second, consistent with the predictions of ourmodel,
we find that correspondence bias is driven by both over-estimation of the prosociality
of the benign-game player and under-estimation of the prosociality of themalign-game
player. In treatment 1 when choosing between a stranger and a benign/malign-game
player, subjects prefer the benign-game player to the stranger, and the stranger to the
malign-game player.
We also test twopotentialmethods to reduce or even eliminate correspondence bias.
First, we study whether experiencing instead of observing the games can help to reduce
the bias. Experiencing both games in Treatment 3, as opposed to only learning about
it in Treatment 2, should help people to understand that actions are game-contingent,
and they should take the games into account when inferring from the actions. Consis-
tent with such an effect, we find that the benign premium in Treatment 3 is smaller than
that in Treatment 2, although it is still significantly greater than 0 in Treatment 3 (at the
1% level), suggesting that experiencing both games is not enough to eliminate the bias.
Second, we investigate the effect on reducing the bias of providing counterfactual infor-
mation. In treatment 4, as subjects knowbothplayers’ action in both games, they should
be able to compare their actions in the same games, which should alleviate the bias. We
find that providing counterfactual information reduces the benign premium to 2 cents,
which is not significantly different from 0, and is significantly smaller than that in Treat-
ments 2 and 3.
The research that this study is most closely related to is Haggag, Pope, Bryant-Lees
and Bos (2019)’s investigation of “Attribution Bias in Consumer Choice.” In their study,
similar to ours, people underweight the impact of a transitory state on the utility of con-
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suming a good, and misattribute it to the enduring characteristic of the good. The cur-
rent research follows on their contribution by showing that attribution bias not only ex-
ists when it comes to evaluating consumption experiences, but also for evaluating peo-
ple. Agents in Haggag, Pope, Bryant-Lees and Bos (2019)’s model do not fully appreciate
the fact that their preferences are state-dependent; similarly, agents in our work fail to
fully recognize that actions of other people are game-dependent. While Haggag, Pope,
Bryant-Lees and Bos (2019) has important implications for individual decision making,
our analysis shows that attribution bias also plays a vital role in economic interactions.
We also add to their work by exploring potential debiasingmethods. We show that expe-
riencing both games instead of observing them reduces the attribution bias, and provid-
ing “counterfactual” information eliminates the bias. Our results provide an explanation
for their finding that the extent of past experiences can attenuate the attribution bias in
consumption choice.
Correspondence bias, previously designated the “fundamental attribution bias,” has
been intensively studied by psychologist since the 1960s (Jones and Harris, 1967; Ross,
1977; Gilbert andMalone, 1995). In a typical study, subjects listen to a speech arguing in
favor of or against an opinion, and are asked to rate the attitudes of the speaker towards
that opinion. A repeatedly-replicated finding is that, even when subjects are told that
the speaker’s positions are randomly assigned by the experimenter, they still rate speak-
ers who are asked to speak in favor of the opinion as more supportive of it. The most
common explanation for it in psychology is that the person (or internal characteristics)
is more “salient" than the situation (or external factors), and thus people tend to under-
estimate the influence of the situation. We formulate the bias in a different way. We are
less focused on the salience of other people’s characteristic, but more on assessments
of their stability. In our formulation in the following section of the paper, it is people’s
failure to fully account for the incentive-contingent nature of other’s actions that leads
them to under-attribute actions to situations.
The current study augments the existing psychology research on correspondence
bias in three ways. First, the standard experimental paradigm for studying correspon-
dence in psychology suffers from the potential confound that subjects may believe that
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the randomly assignedpositions canpotentially shape the speakers’ attitudes. Aswedis-
cussed, our design rules this out. Second, in an environment that closelymimics real life
interpersonal interactions, our design clearly shows that correspondencebias iswelfare-
reducing. Third, we provide a suggestion for how to reduce or eliminate correspondence
bias by providing counterfactual information.
We also contribute to the literature on people’s belief updating relative to Bayesian
updating. Previous evidence suggests that people generally infer less fromevidence than
Bayes’ Theorem predicts (Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Edwards, 1968; Möbius, Niederle,
Niehaus and Rosenblat, 2014; Ambuehl and Li, 2018). However, as pointed out by Kah-
neman, this finding is in contrast to the everyday experience that people often jump to
conclusions based on a little information. We provide another reason, in addition to the
Law of Small Numbers (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) and base-rate neglect (Kahne-
manandTversky, 1973), forwhypeoplemaydrawoverly extremeconclusions fromsmall
samples.1 In our case, people jump from observations of other’s action in narrow con-
texts to conclusions about those people’s underlying qualities, without paying sufficient
attention to the transient incentives they are facing.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes a simple model of correspon-
dence bias. Section 3.3 introduces our experimental design and the predictions it tests.
Section3.4presents results, andSection3.5 concludesanddiscussespolicy implications.
3.2 Model
In this section, we build a simple model of correspondence bias that is in a similar
spirit to the cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). In our model, the individual
does not fully take into account the fact that other people’s actions depend on the in-
centives they face (or the game they play). They are aware of the distributions of actions
among others, but they underestimate the correlation between actions and the game
structure when they try to interpret other people’s actions.
1Formore discussion on over-inference, see Benjamin (2019).
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Consider two games τ ∈ {b,m}, the benign game b and themalign game m. In each
complete information game, there are two actions to take: {C ,D}. There are two types of
agent, the good type G and the bad type B. Let the probability of being the good type be
P (ti =G)= p0. In the benign game τb, both the good type and the bad type chooses C ; in
the malign game τm, the good type chooses C and the bad type chooses D. Half of the
players are assigned to play the benign game, and the other half are assigned to play the
malign game.
After observing player i ’s action in the benign game abi and player j ’s action in the
malign game amj , player k needs to choose between i and j to play a follow-up game. k’s
payoff in the follow-up game is defined by the type of the partner of her choosing. If we
normalize the payoff of choosing type B to be 0 and choosing type G to be 1, then player
k’s payoff for choosing i to play the follow-up game is given by
Uki = P (ti =G)−P (t j =G) (3.1)
Without loss, the payoff for choosing j is normalized to 0.
Define p(·) as the true probability andpi(·) as a person’s potentially biased belief. For a
Bayesian agent, the posterior can be calculated conditional on the games i and j played.
As both types choose C in the benign game, the posterior pi(ti = G | abi ) = p(ti = G | abi )
is equal to the prior, p0. In the malign game, player j ’s type is perfectly revealed. If she
chooses C , then pi(t j =G | amj =C )= 1; if she chooses D, then pi(t j =G | amj =D)= 0. There-
fore, pimD <pibC <pimC , where piτa is the Bayesian agent’s posterior belief about someone who
chooses action a in game τ being the good type.
The correspondence-biased agent knows thedistributionof actions across thewhole
population, but they cannot fully account their opponent’s action based on the game
they played. Borrowing from Eyster and Rabin (2005)’s cursed equilibrium, we define an
agent as χ-biased if
p˜iτa =χ(
1
2
piba +
1
2
pima )+ (1−χ)(piτa) (3.2)
where p˜iτa is the correspondence-biased agent’s posterior belief about the player who
chooses action a in game τ, 12 is theprobability one is assigned toplay thebenigngameor
89
themalign game. Intuitively, χ-biased agent only recognizes the action of her opponent
but ignores the incentive/game structure she faces with probability χ. In this case, she
replaces the actual probability pτa =piτa of her opponent being the good type given action
a in game τwith the average probability 12piba + 12pima of her opponent being the good type
given action a across the two games. If χ = 0, then the χ-biased agent’s posterior is the
same with the Bayesian agent. As long as χ> 0, we can conclude that
pimD = p˜imD <pibC < p˜ibC ≤ p˜imC <pimC (3.3)
, where p˜ibC = p˜imC when χ= 1.
Therefore, the probability of the benign game player i being the good type given she
choosesC is overestimated, orpibC < p˜ibC . Theprobability of themaligngameplayer j being
the good type given he chooses C is underestimated, or p˜imC < pimC . It is important to note
that the χ-biased agent can still make the inference that amC is a stronger signal for the
good type than abC , i.e. p˜ibC ≤ p˜imC , but they underestimate the difference between the two:
p˜imC − p˜ibC <pimC −pibC .
The correspondence bias implies an over-evaluation of the payoff for choosing the
benign-game player. Depending on the malign-game player j ’s choice, there are two
cases: abi = C ,amj = D and abi = C ,amj = C . In the first case, the Bayesian agent should
conclude that the payoff for choosing the benign-game player equals to
Uki =pibC −pimD (3.4)
However, the correspondence biased agent would believe that the payoff of choosing i ,
Uˆki , is
Uˆki = p˜ibC − p˜imD (3.5)
As p˜ibC >pibC and p˜imD =pimD , Uˆki >Uki . Similarly, when abi =C ,amj =C , as p˜ibC >pibC and p˜imC <pimC ,
Uˆki is also larger thanUki .
For a Bayesian agent, the expected benefit of choosing i should be 0. TheMartingale
90
property of Bayesian updating implies that
E [pi | τ= b]= E [pi | τ=m]= p0 (3.6)
Intuitively, as whether one plays the benign game or the malign game is completely de-
termined by chance, i and j are equally likely to be the good type ex ante. As expected
posterior is equal to the prior, they are equally likely to be the good type in expectation
ex post.
However, for a correspondence-biased agent, the expected benefit of choosing i is
larger than 0. As p˜ibC > pibC = p0 for the biased agent, E [p˜i | τ = b] > p0. As pimD = p˜imD and
p˜imC <pimC , E [p˜i | τ=m]< E [pi | τ=m]= p0. Therefore, for the correspondence-biased agent
E [p˜i | τ=m]< p0 < E [p˜i | τ= b] (3.7)
We summarize our main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. i) For any χ ∈ (0,1], a χ-biased individual is willing to pay an expected
benign premium of E [p˜i | τ = b]−E [p˜i | τ = m] > 0 to be matched with the benign-game
player.
ii) For anyχ ∈ (0,1], aχ-biased individual iswilling topayanexpectedpremiumfor the
benign-game player when choosing between her and a stranger, and is willing to pay an
expected premium for the stranger when choosing between him and the malign-game
player.
3.3 Design
The experiment has three stages. At the first stage, all subjects make a decision as
the dictator in the dictator game. At the second stage, they are randomly matched into
groups of 4 to play the benign game and the malign game. They are encouraged to co-
operate with their partners in the benign game, but are motivated to behave selfishly in
the malign game. Lastly, they are asked, as the receiver, to choose a dictator between a
benign game player and a malign game player to play the first stage dictator game. Our
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model predicts that there exists a benign premium: subjects are on averagewilling to pay
to bematched with the benign-game player.
3.3.1 First Stage
Theexperiment is conductedonline, and subjects are recruited throughAmazonMe-
chanical Turk (Mturk). Upon arriving at the studywebsite, subjects are instructed to play
a dictator game as the dictator. They need to divide 200 cents between themselves and a
random receiver. As in a standard dictator game, the receiver has no influence over the
outcome of the game, and both the receiver and the dictator receives 50 cents of endow-
ment prior to the split decision. Subjects are also informed that even though everyone
needs to make the decision, only half of those decisions will be implemented later. At
this stage, they have no idea of the future stages or the identity of the potential random
receiver. This dictator decision serves as our measure of one’s prosociality.
3.3.2 Second Stage
At the second stage, subjects are randomly matched into 4-player groups. Everyone
is randomly assigned a role. There are 4 roles in each 4-player group. We name them A,
B, C and D. Then the participants play the benign and/or the malign games with mem-
bers in their own group. Depending on the treatment, a subject may interact with 1 or 2
roles at this stage. One’s own role and the roles one play with in this stage are common
knowledge. The two games are defined as follows.
Themalign game is a two-player one-short Prisoner’s Dilemma game—see left panel
in Table 3.1. Participants in this game must choose between cooperate (C) and defect
(D).2 It is a dominant strategy to choose D for both players. TheNash equilibrium of this
game is (D,D), which leads to the payoffs (30,30). Even though D is the dominant strat-
egy in this game, previous studies show that not everyone chooses to defect, and those
who choose to cooperate are more prosocial than those who choose to defect (Cooper,
2The actions C and Dwere respectively labeled “Action 1” and “Action 2” in the experiment to ensure a
neutral presentation.
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DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, 1996; Barreda-Tarrazona, Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Pavan and
Sabater-Grande, 2017). Conveniently, wedefine subjectswho choose to cooperate in the
malign game as theGood type and subjects who choose to defect in it as the Bad type.
The benign game is the Harmony game as in Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Eyster (2018) -
see right panel in Table 3.1. Participants also choose between cooperate (C) and defect
(D). However, (C,C) is the dominant strategy equilibrium and Pareto dominates all other
strategy profiles in this game. It is easy for the subjects to figure out that they should
choose C.
To ease understanding, we will illustrate the rest of the experimental design in terms
of Treatment 2, which we believe to be closest to reality. We will then discuss the differ-
ences between the treatments at the end of this section. In treatment 2, subjects play
one game, and observe outcomes of the other game. To be more specific, player A and
B play the benign game, and C and D play themalign game. Even though they only play
one game, we also give them the instructions of the other game. Therefore, they can still
understand the incentives of the game they do not play.
After the actions being taken, subjects enter the information provision page. In this
page, they learn about their payoffs in the game they play and the action of their partner
in that game. We also display the payoff table of the two games again tominimize confu-
sions and incorrect recalls. In addition, they are also informed of the action of one of the
two players in the game they do not play. To be more precise, A (B) in the benign game
also learns whether D (C) in the malign game chooses to cooperate or defect. Similarly,
C (D) also learns the action of B (A) in the benign game.
Subjects are forced to stay at least 120 seconds on the information provision page to
make sure that they take the time tounderstand thegamestructure, andmake inferences
about the types of their partners based on their actions.
3.3.3 Third Stage
At the third stage, every subject has the opportunity to choose a dictator’s transfers in
the first stage between amalign-game player and a benign-game player. The two candi-
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dates are those twowhose actions in stage 2were shown to the subject in the information
provision phase. For example, A played the benign gamewith B and observed D’s action
in themalign game. Then in stage 3, A needs to choose between B andD’s dictator trans-
fers in the first stage dictator game. Therefore, whenmaking the choice between the two
candidates, the subject can reply on the inferences shemade from their actions in stage
2.
After reading the instructions for stage 3 and before making any decisions, subjects
are asked to answer 3 comprehension questions. Only those who answer all the 3 ques-
tions correctly canproceed tomake their choices in this stage. Thosewhoat least answer
one question incorrectly need to re-do all the 3 questions again until they get them all
correct. 3
After a subjectmakes the choice between the two candidates, we use amultiple price
list to elicit her willingness to pay to be matched with the partner of her choosing. The
list shown to A if she chooses B over D in the first choice is displayed in Table 3.2 as an
example. In total, subjects need to make 10 additional choices after the first choice. In
each choice, there are two options. D+(x cents)means if in this choice A chooses D, then
she can get an extra reward of x cents. But if she chooses B, there is no extra reward. The
point where A switches from option 1 to option 2 defines A’s willingness to pay to get B.
For example, if A chooses option 1 for choice 1 to 7 and option 2 for choice 8 to 10, then it
means A believes that B gave 70 to 80 more than D in the dictator game on expectation.
One of these 11 choices (including the one between B and D with no extra rewards) will
be randomly selected as the choice-that-counts.
As everymemberof the groupmakes a choicebetween2potential dictators, there are
4 choice-that-counts in total. We randomly select 1of the4 to implement. If one’s choice-
that-counts is chosen, then she gets the dictator’s transfers of her choosing plus the extra
rewards. The candidate she did not choose also becomes the dictator, and the remain-
ing player of the 4 becomes another receiver. For example, if A’s choice-that-counts is
3Please seeAppendix xxx for thecomprehensionquestions. Asonecannotproceed to thedecision stage
of stage 3 without answering all 3 questions correct, some subjects dropped out in this stage. Out of 1037
subjects who signed up for the experiment, 158 of them only finished stage 2. As stage 3 is not interactive,
the dropouts of those subjects have no impact on the rest in the same groups.
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Choice 5, she choosesOption 2 and her choice-that-count is chosen to be implemented,
then A will be matched with D with a 60 cents extra reward. The two remaining partici-
pants are automaticallymatched afterwards with B being the dictator as Bwas one of A’s
candidates.
The dictator’s decisions which were made at the first stage are then carried out. For
example, suppose B chose to give x cents to the random receiver at the first stage, then A
gets x cents and B gets (200−x) cents if A and B arematched with B being the dictator.
3.3.4 Three Confounders
Our three-stage design deals with three challenges to identify the correspondence
bias. As predicted by our model, correspondence bias leads to a benign premium: a
positive willingness to pay to get the benign-game player instead of the malign-game
player. However, other forces can also produce a benign premium. The first possibility
is choosing the benign-game player can be consistent with Bayesian updating as some-
onewho chooses to cooperate in the benign game is expected to bemorepro-social than
someone who chooses to defect in the malign game. Second, reciprocity can also moti-
vate choosing the benign game player. Participantsmaywant to reciprocate the benign-
game player in the follow-up game as he/she has been nice to them (or another player)
in the benign game. Similarly, they may also want to punish the malign-game player
for choosing the selfish option. Third, institution can also shape people’s prosociality
(Peysakhovich and Rand, 2015; Cason, Lau and Mui, 2019). Even if the benign-game
player and the malign-game player are ex ante the same, the benign-game player can
be shaped into a nicer person by the game, and it makes sense to choose her over the
malign-game player.
Aswe only look at people’s averagewillingness to pay to bematchedwith the benign-
game player and subjects are randomly assigned to play the benign game or the malign
game, Bayesian updating cannot explain a positive benign premium. The intuition is as
subjects are randomly assigned to the games, the two players are equally likely to to be
theGood type ex ante. According to themartingale property of Bayesian belief, expected
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posterior equals to prior, which implies that the two players are equally likely to be the
Good type on expectation ex post. Therefore, on expectation, Bayesian subjects should
treat the benign-game player and themalign-game player equally.
The feature that there is no choice for the receiver tomake in the dictator game helps
usdealwith the reciprocity confounder. In the third stagewhenchoosing thedictatorbe-
tween the twocandidates, even if the subjectwant to reciprocate thebenign-gameplayer
there is no way for them to do so. First, as there is no choice in the dictator game for the
receiver, she cannot choose thebenign-gameplayer and thenbenice toher in the follow-
up game. Second, one may worry that choosing the benign-game player as the dictator
in the third stage per se can be seen as reciprocity. Even though a player is indeed ex-
pected to earnmore being the dictator than being the receiver, choosing him/her in the
third stage does not increase his/her chance of being the dictator. As illustrated earlier,
which two players become the dictators is solely determined by chance. One’s choice
in the third stage only affects which one of the two becomes her own dictator (in case
he/she is chosen to be one of the two dictators).
Putting the dictator decision ahead of the second stage games solves the third con-
founder that institution shapes one’s prosociality. The idea is at the third stage, the dic-
tators have already made their decisions about how much to transfer in the first stage.
Therefore, what happens at the second stage cannot have an impact on them. Even if
the benign-game player becomes a nicer person after playing the game, her choice in
the first stage remains the same. All the subjects have to do is to draw inferences about
theplayers’ types from the second stage, and choose the onewho theybelieve tobemore
pro-social in Stage 1.
3.3.5 Treatments
There are four treatments in the experiment and they only differ in the second stage.
What separate them from each other is how many games each subject plays and how
much information they get.
As stated earlier, in Treatment 2 each player only plays one game. In the information
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stage, in addition to the outcomes and the action of the opponent in the game one plays,
he/she also observes the action of one other player who plays the other game.
In Treatment 1 (as indicated in Figure 3.1), similar to Treatment 2, each player only
plays one game, either the benign or the malign game. However, in this treatment sub-
jects are not aware of the existence of the other game. At the third stage, subjects will be
asked to choose between their opponent in the second stage and a random stranger.
InTreatment3, all the settingsare the samewithTreatment2except that subjectsplay
both games in the second stage. In the information stage, they learn the actions of both
their opponents and their outcomes in the two games, which is equivalent to Treatment
2 except that all information are gathered through “experience” insteadof partly through
“observation” as in Treatment 2.
In Treatment 4, all settings remain the same with one exception: subjects are also
informed of the behaviors of their opponents in the game they does not play together. In
Treatment 3, A (C) plays the benign gamewith B (D) and themalign gamewithD (B). But
A (C) cannot observewhich action B (D) chooses in themalign (benign) gamewithC (A),
orwhichactionD(B) chooses in thebenign (malign) gamewithC (A).While inTreatment
4, all such information is available. Therefore, when A chooses between B and D, A not
only knows the action they choose when they are playing with her, but also is aware of
their behaviors in the alternative situation.
3.3.6 Predictions
The four-treatmentdesignhelpsus investigate the causesof the correspondencebias
and the potential ways to reduce or even eliminate it.
Treatment 2 is our baseline treatment, and we can test the existence of correspon-
dence bias by looking at the benign premium in this treatment.
Prediction 1. There exists a benign premium in Treatment 2, i.e., the averagewilling-
ness to pay towards the benign-game player is larger than 0.
Treatment 1 aims to decompose the benign premium. As no information is provided
on the stranger, the chance of her being the Good type equals to the prior, p0. Thus,
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Treatment 1 helps us separate benign premium E [p˜i | τ = b]−E [p˜i | τ =m] into two parts:
under-estimate of the chance of the malign-game player being the Good type p0−E [p˜i |
τ =m] and over-estimate of the chance of the benign-game player being the Good type
E [p˜i | τ= b]−p0. While Bayesian inference predicts that E [pi | τ=m]= E [pi | τ= b]= p0, we
predict that for correspondence-biased agents E [p˜i | τ=m]< p0 < E [p˜i | τ= b].
Prediction 2. In Treatment 1, the average willingness to pay for the benign-game
player when choosing between her and a random stranger is positive; the average will-
ingness to pay for the malign-game player when choosing between him and a random
stranger is negative.
Treatment 3 is set to test whether inattention to strategic motives is a cause of cor-
respondence bias. As participants play both games in this treatment, they have a better
understanding of the incentives in the two games. In Treatment 2, the subject may only
pay attention to behaviors without understanding the incentives behind them. Conse-
quently, she tends to treat cooperation in the two games equally even though it is amuch
stronger signal of the Good type to cooperate in the malign game. When she play both
games herself in treatment 3, she is more likely to know that choosing cooperation does
not mean the same thing across the two games. We therefore predict that subjects who
only play the malign game in treatment 2 pay the same benign premium as the average
subject in treatment 3; while subjects who only play the benign game in treatment 2 are
willing to pay a higher benign premium than an average subject in treatment 3.
Prediction 3. The benign premium is smaller in Treatment 3 than in Treatment 2.
In Treatment 4, we test whether providing counter-factual information reduces the
correspondence bias. In Treatment 2 and 3, the participant is not able to know how the
benign-game player performs in themalign game, and vise versa. However, in treatment
4, such information is available, and subjects can clearly see how other’s actions change
according to the incentives. If the correspondence bias is caused by failing to fully ac-
count for the impact of the incentives on actions, then enabling people to compare op-
ponents’ behaviors in the same game with the same incentives should reduce the bias
significantly.
Prediction 4. The benign premium is smaller in Treatment 4 than in Treatment 3.
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3.4 Results
The experiment was conducted on AmazonMechanical Turk between October 12th
2018 andDecember 7th 2018. We also included data from two earlier pilots on June 11th
2018 and July 17th 2018. As our experiment is rather complicated, we only recruit sub-
jects who at least have a two-year associate degree. We also restrict our participants to
those who are residents in the United States. On average, the experiment lasts 20.1min-
utes and subjects earn 2.77 dollars on average. Overall, we recruited 839 subjects, with
133 in treatment 1, 251 in treatment 2, 228 in treatment 3 and 227 in treatment 4.45
For amanipulation check,we look at the cooperation rate in the twogames. While al-
most everyone chose to cooperate in the benign game (94.87%), the frequency of choos-
ing cooperation was much lower in the malign game (41.05%). Subjects who chose co-
operation in themalign game is indeedmore pro-social than those who chose to defect.
As shown in Figure 3.4, subjects in the benign game on average transferred 66.18 cents
in the first stage. While subjects who chose C in themalign game transferred 76.51 cents
in the first stage, subjects who chose D only transferred 59.04 cents. The average trans-
fers by themalign-gameplayerswere 66.21 cents, which is very close to thebenign-game
player’s average.
Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics and thebalance check. It indicates that there’s
no significant difference in the amount of money people choose to keep in the dictator
game in stage one among the treatments. A nature concern is that subjects may change
their behaviors between treatment 2 and treatment 3 due to the number of games they
play. Thecooperation rates in themaligngame in the two treatments arenot significantly
different from each other (p-value=0.753).
Result 1: Correspondence bias exists in the baseline treatment.We first look at the
existence of correspondence bias in our baseline treatment, Treatment 2. As predicted
4We received a total of 879 responses, but dropped 40 subjects (4.6%)who exhibitedmultiple switching
points in themultiple price-list questions at the third stage.
5We randomly assign less subjects to Treatment 1 based on apower calculation. Weneedmore subjects
in the other 3 treatments because we need to test whether the benign premium is significantly different
between two treatments. While in Treatment 1, we only need to test whether the average willingness to
pay is significantly different from 0 or not.
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by a rational Bayesian model, subjects should be indifferent between the benign-game
player and the malign-game player on average when choosing their dictator in stage 3.
However, ourmodel predicts a benign premium: the average willingness to pay towards
the benign-game player is larger than 0. Using the multiple price list, we define the be-
nignpremiumas the switchpointbetweenOption1andOption2 inTable 3.2. We further
code the benign premium as positive if a subject chooses the benign-game player in the
first choice, and negative otherwise. Since themultiple price list can only elicit intervals
of benign premium, our preferred measure uses the mid-point of the interval as the be-
nign premium.6 For example, if subject A chooses B (the benign-game player)’s transfer
over D (the malign-game player)’s transfer plus 10 cents bonus, and she switches to D’s
transfer plus 20 cents, then A’s benign premium is coded as 15 cents.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the average willingness to pay towards the benign-game
player is 12.48 cents in Treatment 2, which is significantly larger than 0 at the 1% level.
One way to interpret this result is subjects on average believe that the benign-game
player transferred 12.48more cents in stage 1 than themalign-game player. To put those
numbers into perspectives, one can compare them with the maximum possible benign
premium 100 cents. 7
Wefurther explore the shareof subjectswhoare correspondence-biased in treatment
2. It ishard to tell someone isbiasedornotwhen themalign-gameplayer choosesD.Both
theBayesianmodel andourmodel predict that subjects should choose thebenign-game
player, and the only difference is our model predicts a larger willingness to pay towards
the benign-game player. However, the case when the malign-game player choose C is
more clear-cut. While a Bayesian subject should choose themalign-gameplayer for sure
regardless of her prior, our model predicts that a fully correspondence-biased subject is
indifferent between the two players and may choose the benign-game player. Our data
shows that there are still 52.88 % of subjects choose the benign-game player over the
malign-game player when the latter chooses to cooperate.
6Our results are robust if we use theminimum (maximum) value of the interval as the benign premium
(Figure 3.5).
7A completely selfish individual transfers 0 in stage 1, while an altruistic individual whoweights other’s
utility exactly as much as her own transfers 100 cents in stage 1. Therefore, the largest possible difference
between the two potential opponents’ transfer is 100 cents.
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Result 2: Evidence suggests that the correspondence bias is caused by subjects’
failures to fully account for the correlation between actions and incentives. In Treat-
ment 1, subjects only play one game, and are asked to choose between their partner and
a random stranger in stage 3. As predicted by the model, a Bayesian subject should be
indifferent between her partner and the stranger on average regardless which game they
played together. However, the gameone is assigned to play does have an impact on one’s
willingness to pay towards the stranger and theWTP is not 0.
Treatment 1 ismore comparable to previous studies in psychology on the correspon-
dence bias. We randomly assign the subjects to interact with someone in a benign envi-
ronment or a malign environment, and we aim to test whether this randomly assigned
environment has an impact on subject’s evaluation on their partner or not. Out results
show that theorthogonal environmenthas a strongeffect on subjects’WTP towards their
partner. When the game played together is the benign-game, the average willingness to
pay for the partner over the stranger is 13.82; when the game is the malign-game, the
average WTP for the partner is -8.85, meaning that subjects are willing to pay to get the
stranger, instead of their partner, as their dictator. The two WTPs are significantly dif-
ferent fromeach other (p-value<0.001,Wilcoxon ranksum test), which serves as another
piece of evidence for the correspondence bias.
Treatment 1 also serves as a test of our formulation of the correspondence bias. If the
bias is causedbypeople’s failure to fully account for thedegrees towhich incentivesaffect
actions, then we would predict that they prefer the benign-game player to the stranger
and prefer the stranger to the malign-game player. Our results are consistent with this
prediction. As showed above, theWTP for the benign-game player is positive and is sig-
nificantly different from 0, with a p-value of 0.009. Meanwhile, the WTP for the malign-
game player is negative and is also significantly different from 0 (p-value=0.072). The
negative WTP for the malign-game player is unlikely to be a mistake as subjects do re-
spond to the malign-game player’s actions. When the malign-game player chooses to
cooperate, the average WTP towards her is 12.6; when the malign-game player chooses
D, the averageWTP is -22.25.
Result 3: Experience reduces the correspondence bias, but it alone is not able to
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eliminate the bias. Previous results jointly show that there exists a correspondence bias:
subjects tend to believe that someone who is randomly assigned to play a benign game
is more pro-social than someone who is randomly assigned to play a malign game. The
next question is can we alleviate this bias? By comparing treatment 2 with treatment 3,
we can see the effect of letting the subjects experience both regimes to understand the
strategicmotives better. The only difference between the two treatments is that subjects
only play one game but observe the other one in treatment 2, while in treatment 3 they
play both. The average benign premium decreases from 11.57 in Treatment 2 to 7.98 in
Treatment 3, with a p-value of 0.298.
The reduction in benign premium from Treatment 2 to 3 is mainly driven by the re-
duction in benign premiums of subjects whose malign-game player chooses to defect.
As shown in Figure 3.3, when the malign-game player chooses D, the benign premium
reduces from 20.21 to 15.23 (p-value=0.195). Meanwhile, the benign-premium only re-
duces from-0.05 to -1.98when themalign-gameplayer chooses tocooperate. The results
suggest that experience is better at reducing the over-estimation of the niceness of the
benign-game player. It has little effect on reducing the under-estimation of the niceness
of themalign-game player.
One potential concern is the difference between treatment 2 and treatment 3 can
also be driven by inattention to partner’s choices instead of inattention to the strate-
gic motives. Subjects might only pay attention to the game they played and ignored the
other game. To deal with this issue, we further look at how subjects who only played the
benign-game respond to malign-game players’ choices. If they are paying no attention
to the malign-game player’s choices, then the benign premium should be the same re-
gardless of the choices. Table 3.5 shows that for benign-gameonly players, when thema-
lign game player choose to cooperate, their benign premium is 13.89; while when they
choose to defect, the benign premium increases to 26.84. The two amounts are signifi-
cantly different from each other (p-value=0.065).
Experience alone is not sufficient to eliminate the correspondence bias. The benign
premium in Treatment 3 is still significantly larger than 0 (p-value=0.002, t-test).
Result 4: Providing counterfactual information in addition to letting subjects ex-
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perience both games can eliminate the correspondence bias. The result is mainly
driven by reduction in over-estimation of the niceness of the benign-game player. By
comparing treatment 3and treatment 4,wecan study theeffect of informing the subjects
the “counterfactual". When we not only let subjects learn the behaviors of two partners
byplayinggameswith themas in treatment 3, but also informthemthebehaviorsof their
partners in the game they did not play together in treatment 4, the benign premium fur-
ther decreases to 2.14,which is not significantly different fromzero (p=0.401). Thediffer-
ence between Treatment 3 and Treatment 4 in benign premium is significant at the 10%
level (p-value=0.077), suggesting providing counterfactual can alleviate the correspon-
dence bias. The difference between Treatment 2 and Treatment 4 is significant at the 1%
level (p-value=0.007), which indicates that experience plus counterfactual information
can jointly eliminate the bias.
The reduction in WTP for the benign-game player between Treatment 3 and 4 is
mainly driven by the reduction in benign premiums of subjects whose malign-game
player chooses todefect. TheWTPreduces from15.23 to6.37, and thedifference is signif-
icant at the 10% level (p-value=0.093). TheWTP for thebenign-gameplayer inTreatment
4 is very close to the rational level with the correct prior. As 3.4 illustrates, the difference
in stage 1 transfer between the benign-game player (66.18) and the malign game player
(59.04) who choose to defect is 7.14. It shows that the over-estimation of the niceness of
the benign-game player is almost gone.At the same time, when themalign-game player
chooses to cooperate, the benign premium reduces from -1.98 in Treatment 3 to -3.65.8
This result that providing the “counterfactuals" help to de-bias also explains why we
always observe the correspondencebias in real life: it is impossible to observe the “coun-
terfactual" in everyday life. For example, in a society with low mobility, the rich is born
rich and the poor may remain poor. It is hard to see how the rich would behave if they
were poor, and it is hard to observe how the poor would behave if they got rich. Even if
some people experienced both cases, it is hard for others to witness how they behaved
in the two different situations.
8Again, it is also closer to the rational amount with correct prior, −10.33= 66.18−76.51.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigate people’s tendency to underestimate the correlation between
other’s actions and the incentives he/she faces when drawing inferences about other’s
enduring characteristics from their actions. We study this bias in an environment in
which somepeople are assigned to play a benign game that encourages cooperation and
otherpeople are assigned toplay amaligngame that encourages selfishbehaviors. While
a rational Bayesianmodel predicts that people should pick the benign-game player and
themalign-gameplayerwith equal chances in a follow-upgame, ourmodel predicts that
a correspondence-biased individual chooses the onewho played the benign gamemore
often in the follow-up game. The key intuition is failing to fully appreciate the impact of
the incentives on actions leads the biased individual to over-interpret cooperation in the
benign game and under-interpret cooperation in themalign game.
We test the predictions of the model in an experiment with 852 subject. We first ask
subjects tomakeadecisionabouthowmuch to transfer as thedictator inadictator game.
Then we let them play the benign game and the malign game, and inform them the ac-
tions of a benign-game player and a malign-game. Lastly, we ask them to choose, as a
receiver in the dictator game, between the benign-game player and the malign-game
player’s first stage transfer. Wefind strong evidence for correspondence bias. One iswill-
ing to pay 12.48 out of 100 to be matched with the benign-game player in Treatment 2,
our baseline treatment. Allowing subjects to experience both games instead of playing
one and observing the other one reduces the correspondence bias, but the benign pre-
miumis still significantly above0. However, ifwe informsubjectshowtheirbenign-game
partner behaves in themalign-gameand vice versa, the correspondencebias disappears.
Both Treatment 3 and 4 suggests that ignorant to the effect of incentives on actions
is the cause of the correspondence bias. In Treatment 1, we directly test the predictions
of our model. We find that subjects are willing to pay to be matched with the benign-
game player when choosing between her and a stranger, and they are willing to pay to
bematchedwith the stranger when choosing between him and themalign-game player.
This finding is hard to be reconciled with other theories of the correspondence bias.
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Our findings shed lights on both why the correspondence bias is widely observed in
real life and the potential ways to reduce or eliminate it. First, in reality, we often only
experience one environment and observe other environments, which makes it hard for
us to understand how alternative environments affect other people’s behaviors. Accord-
ingly, one potential route to speed up social cohesion is to encourage social interactions
between different groups and let them experience other people’s lives (Rao, 2019; Lowe,
2020). Second, counterfactual information is hard to get in reality. We often only interact
with others in one situation without knowing how they perform in completely different
cases.
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3.6 Figures
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Notes: Figure displays the four treatments in subject A’s perspective. The solid linemeans that A
is able to observe (the outcome of) a game and the dash linemeans that A is not able to observe
a game. But of course, A is not the only active player in the game. The game faces by B, C and
D are symmetric in treatment 2, 3 and 4. For example, player D plays the benign game with C
and themalign gamewith A in treatment 3 and she cannot observe the game played between A
and B or the game played between C and B. The game is not symmetric in treatment 1. In that
treatment, A and B only play the benign game and C and D only play themalign game.
Figure 3.1: Four Treatments
106
13.82
8.85
11.57
7.98
2.14
p=0.298
-5
0
5
10
15
20
W
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 p
ay
 fo
r t
he
 b
en
ig
n 
ga
m
e 
pl
ay
er
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Notes: The left bar in treatment 1 represents the WTP for the benign game player versus a
stranger, and the right bar in treatment 1 represents the WTP for a stranger versus a malign
game player.
Figure 3.2: Benign Premiums across Treatments
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Notes: Figure plots the average benign premiums in treatments 2 to 4, depending on their
malign-game partners’ actions.
Figure 3.3: Benign Premiums depending onMalign-game Partner’s Action
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Note: Figure plots the averagemoney subjects shared in the dictator game at stage one depend-
ing on their own actions in themalign game.
Figure 3.4: The Correlation between Action in theMalign Game and HowMuch shared
in DG
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Note: Figure plots the willingness to pay towards the benign-game player using al-
ternative codingmethods. Panel (a) measures the benign premium as theminimum
value of the interval from the multiple price list. Panel (b) measures the benign pre-
mium as themaximum value of the interval from themultiple price list.
Figure 3.5: Robustness Check - Benign Premium across Treatments
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: The Benign andMalign Games
Harmony Game Prisoners’ Dilemma
C D C D
C 40,40 10,30 C 40,40 20,120
D 30,10 0,0 D 120,20 30,30
Note: The harmony game is the benign game, and the prisoner’s
dilemma is themalign game.
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Table 3.2: TheMultiple Price List
Option 1 Option 2
Choice 1 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+10
Choice 2 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+20
Choice 3 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+30
Choice 4 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+40
Choice 5 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+50
Choice 6 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+60
Choice 7 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+70
Choice 8 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+80
Choice 9 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred tome by D+90
Choice 10 Amount transferred tome by B Amount transferred to me by
D+100
Note: Table shows themultiple price list shown to subject A if she chooses B over D in the first choice.
Table 3.3: Benign Premium across Treatments
Treatment Obs WTP P-value P-value
H0 :wtp = 0 H0 :wtpT x =wtpT3
Treatment 1 benignP VS stranger 68 13.82 0.009
stranger VSmalignP 65 8.85 0.072
Treatment 2 251 11.57 0.000 0.298
Treatment 3 228 7.98 0.002
Treatment 4 227 2.14 0.401 0.077
Notes: The first row in treatment 1 represents theWTP for the benign game player versus a stranger,
and the second row in treatment 1 represents the WTP for a stranger versus a malign game player.
Column (3) reports the p-value of t-tests. Column (4) reports the p-value of Ranksum tests.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4
Howmuch kept in DG 130.7 131.9 133.6 134.7
(40.66) (41.33) (42.24) (42.64)
Cooperation rate in 0.400 0.413 0.360 0.401
themalign game (0.494) (0.494) (0.481) (0.491)
Share of ≥ college degree 0.778 0.813 0.843 0.783
(0.418) (0.391) (0.365) (0.413)
Income 3.778 3.924 3.863 3.826
(1.538) (1.642) (1.541) (1.657)
Share of female 0.547 0.587 0.623 0.527
(0.500) (0.493) (0.486) (0.501)
Age 37.23 38.54 37.28 38.81
(9.955) (11.42) (10.02) (11.79)
Share of working people 0.794 0.809 0.814 0.792
(0.406) (0.394) (0.391) (0.407)
Observations 133 251 228 227
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Benign Premiums in Treatment 2
Malign-game player Ranksum Test
Cooperate Defect p-value
Benign game onlya 13.89 26.84 0.065
Malign game onlyb -14.25 12.79 0.0001
Mean -0.047 20.21 0.0001
Notes: a - subjectswhoonly played the benign game andobserve the
malign game. b - subjects who only played themalign game.
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4.0 Appendices
4.1 Appendix for Chapter 1
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Notes: Figure plots estimates of the effect of the incorporation reform on geographical concen-
tration index in treated prefectures in the years before and after the reform, based on estimates
of coefficients from equation 1.2 at the prefecture level. The dependent variable is the Ellison-
Glaeser index. For prefectures that had several incorporations, I only consider the first incorpo-
ration. Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for the outcome (solid series).
Figure 4.1: Event Study of the Reform on Geographical Concentration
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(a) The impact on GDP per capita (3-year gap)
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(b) The Impact on Lights per km2 (3-year gap)
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(c) The impact on GDP per capita (4-year gap)
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(d) The Impact on Lights per km2 (4-year gap)
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(e) The impact on GDP per capita (6-year gap)
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(f) The Impact on Lights per km2 (6-year gap)
Notes: Robustness check for Approach II. I compare counties that experience the current incorporation to
counties that would experience the reform three, four, six and seven years later respectively. Figure plots
estimates of the effect of the reformonGDPandnighttime lights in treated counties in the years before and
after the reform, based on estimates of coefficients fromequation 1.3. The dependent variables are the log
of GDP per capita or the log of nighttime lights per km2. Dashed line is 95 percent confidence interval for
outcomes (solid series).
Figure 4.2: Robustness: The Impact of Market Integration (Approach II)
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Table 4.1: Factors that Predict Timing of Incorporations
Timing of incorporations
1998 2002 2006 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population (lag) 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Manufacturing share of GDP (lag) -0.217 0.784 0.026 7.005
(0.222) (1.284) (1.051) (7.931)
Tertiary share of GDP (lag) -0.246 0.681 1.154 11.103
(0.259) (1.361) (1.043) (9.810)
Ratio of gov. expenditure to gov. -0.002 -0.058 -0.132 -0.264
revenue (lag) (0.011) (0.101) (0.143) (0.905)
Ratio of gov. revenue to GDP (lag) 0.559 1.463 -31.455 1.660
(1.213) (10.764) (18.889) (54.023)
Ratio of gov. expenditure to GDP -0.462 2.722 16.192* 18.835
(lag) (0.873) (7.432) (8.140) (43.958)
Log of lights per km2 (lag) 0.042 0.203* 0.323* -0.581
(0.042) (0.119) (0.158) (0.626)
Dummy of provincial capital -0.003 -0.104 0.651 -0.257
(0.012) (0.256) (0.417) (0.874)
Dummy of direct-administered 0.101 0.033 1.304*** -
municipalities of China (0.101) (0.175) (0.219) -
Observations 63 41 21 13
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 4.2: Estimated Effects of the Reform on Economic Growth:
Approach I (Without Sample of Direct-administeredMunicipalities of
China)
Dependent variable Log of GDP per capita Log of lights per km2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reform 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.065** 0.044*
(0.041) (0.038) (0.027) (0.026)
County-level controls Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 4,169 3,988 4,370 3,982
R-squared 0.964 0.970 0.983 0.984
Mean DV 8.968 8.968 1.696 1.724
Std.Dev. DV 0.913 0.913 0.853 0.831
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents estimates of β1 from
equation 1.1. All regressions include a full set of county and province×year fixed
effect. Robust standarderrorsare inparentheses, clusteredat thecounty level. The
county-level controls includemanufacturing share of GDP, tertiary industry share
of GDP, ratio of government expenditure to government revenue. Log of popula-
tion is also included as the county-level control for the results on nighttime lights.
118
Table 4.3: Estimated Effects of the Reform on Economic Growth:
Approach II (Without Sample of Direct-administeredMunicipalities of
China)
Dependent variable Log of GDP per capita Log of lights per km2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment×Post 0.125** 0.136*** 0.109*** 0.058**
(0.047) (0.050) (0.029) (0.027)
County-level controls Y Y
County FE Y Y Y Y
Province×Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 9,618 9,367 9,635 9,367
R-squared 0.977 0.983 0.987 0.989
Mean DV 8.761 8.790 1.784 1.812
Std.Dev. DV 0.654 0.634 0.679 0.658
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The columns presents estimates of β1 from
equation 1.4. All regressions include a full set of county and province×year fixed
effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the incorporation
level. The county-level controls include manufacturing share of GDP, tertiary in-
dustry share ofGDP, ratio of government expenditure to government revenue. Log
of population is also included as the county-level control for the results on night-
time lights.
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4.2 Appendix for Chapter 2
4.2.1 Fertility Penalty Data
The fertility penalty data are taken from Scharping (2013), which provides an overall
view of China’s fertility policies and outcomes. Scharping draws on a large number of
primary and secondary sources (statistics, laws, directives, internal documents, confer-
ences, etc.) at local, national and international levels, collected over 10 years. Specifi-
cally, he documented the complete record of the published fine rates across provinces
ranging from 1979 to 2000.1 Wemodified the penalty data for seven provinces: Beijing,
Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Shandong and Guangxi. Furthermore,
we extend the fine rates data from 2000 to 2010 using provincial governments’ docu-
ments.2
Thereweremainly three formsoffinesasdocumentedbyScharping (2013). We trans-
form all three forms into a percentages of a household’s annual income. The first type
was collected from wage earners in the form of regular deductions. For fines levied as
wage deductions, we follow Ebenstein (2010)’s method by calculating the present value
of the penalty at a 2 percent discount rate. For example, in February 1980 Guangdong
province ratified a fine of 10 percent of wage from each parent for 14 years for an un-
sanctioned birth. The present value of the fine is then 1.21 years of income. The detailed
calculation is as follows
Penal t y1980Guangdong = 0.1+0.1× (1−0.02)+0.1× (1−0.02)2+ ...+0.1× (1−0.02)13 = 1.21 (4.2.1)
The second type of fineswas levied as a share of annual income that needs to be paid
in a single payment. For example, Shanghai employed a rule in 1992 that an unautho-
rized birth carried an immediate payment of three years of household income. In this
case, no transformation is needed.
1The data source of Scharping (2013) is based on two books: Zhongguo Jihua ShengyuQuanshu [Ency-
clopedia of Birth Planning in China] and Zhongguo Renkou Congshu 1987-1993.
2The data were downloaded from http://www.pkulaw.cn/
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The third type of fines was collected as an immediate payment of a certain amount
of money, independent of one’s household income. For example, from 1995 to 2000,
Guangxi ratified the fine as an amount between 2,000 and 50,000 yuan. In this circum-
stance, Ebenstein (2010) calculates the fine amount with the following assumptions.
First, the fine was collected at the maximum amount of the range;3 second, the aver-
age household annual income was fixed at 10,000 RMB across province and time.4 We
can apply his rules to the Guangxi example. According to the first assumption, themax-
imum amount in the range, 50,000 yuan, is taken as the penalty amount. Then based on
the second assumption, the 50,000 yuanfine is equivalent to 50,00010,000 = 5 years of household
income.
For the third typeoffines, insteadof assuming that theannualhousehold incomewas
fixed at 10,000 RMB across province and year, we impute the fine into a share of house-
hold income using the provincial average household annual income in a certain year.
The income is only averaged at the provincial level because fines data are only available
at this level, andwewant to keep the units of data consistent. The income data are taken
from the China Statistical Yearbooks. We add this variation of income across province
and time for two reasons. First, there is an substaintial variation of annual household
income across provinces in China at that time. For instance, the annual household in-
comes were 4,630 yuan in Liaoning and 7,095 yuan in Beijing in 1993. In the same year,
both provinces levied an amount of 50,000 yuan fine for an unauthorized child. Clearly,
the same amount of fine would not be the same for households in Liaoning and house-
holds in Beijing.
Second, there is also substantial time variation in annual household income within
a province due to the rapid economic growth in the 1990s. For example, Beijing ratified
the fine as 50,000 yuan from 1991 to 2000, while the average household annual income
increased from 4,371 yuan in 1991 to 20,833 yuan in 2000. Hence, we calculate the fines
as 50,0004,371 = 11.44 years of income in 1991, and as
50,000
20,833 = 2.40 years of income in 2000.
3We also assume that the fine was collected at the maximum amount, hereafter we only talk about the
maximum amount.
4The only exception for the second assumption is Heilongjiang from 1983 to 1988, whose average an-
nual household income is taken as 1,000 yuan.
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4.2.2 The One-tailed T Test for Sex Ratios
Thepublicly availabledataof sex ratios at thefirst birth inurbanChina is very limited:
we have one year across provinces’ sex ratios from the 2000 Census. The small sample
size leads to a lot of random variations in the sex ratios. We cannot simply say provinces
with sex ratios that are out of the normal range have severe sex selections.
To address this concern, we construct a one-tailed t-statistics to test whether the cal-
culated sex ratio (with limited sample size) is statistically different from thebiological sex
ratio (1.06 boys/girls). We treat the gender of the first child, Di as a Bernoulli trial with a
probability p = 0.515(106/206) to be a boy. Let’s denote child i’s gender as Di . Formally,
Di =

1, if i is a boy.
0, otherwise.
(4.2.2)
Under biological sex ratio, we should observe a boy with a probability of 0.515. Let
the biological share of boys be P (Di = 1) = p, the calculated share of boys be pˆ, and the
sample size be n. The null hypothesis is H0 : p = 0.515. As Di is a Bernoulli trial,
pˆ =
∑n
i=1Di
n
. (4.2.3)
Then, we can get E(Di )= p and Var (Di )= p(1−p). By the central limit theorem,
p
n(pˆ−p)≡
p
n
∑n
i=1Di
n
−p d−→N(0,p(1−p)) (4.2.4)
As a result, p
n(pˆ−p)√
p(1−p)
d−→N(0,1) (4.2.5)
So we can construct the following t-statistics:
t ≡
p
n(pˆ−0.515)√
pˆ(1− pˆ)
. (4.2.6)
Since we are only concerned with the possibility that people endogenously choose boys
over girls, we focus on a one-tailed t test and reject the null hypothesis if t > 1.645. We
find that six provinces’ sex ratios at first birth were significantly higher than the normal
sex ratio at the 5 percent level: Beijing, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei, Guangdong, andGuangxi
(Table 4.4).
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Table 4.4: Sex Ratio at First Birth (Males/Females) in
Urban China in 2000
Province Obs Sex ratio One-tailed t-statistics
Beijing 4579 1.130 2.156
Tianjin 2282 1.063 0.074
Hebei 8356 1.090 1.277
Shanxi 5582 1.081 0.742
Liaoning 10525 1.061 0.063
Jilin 4940 1.104 1.426
Heilongjiang 7108 1.079 0.747
Shanghai 5518 1.089 1.014
Jiangsu 12635 1.099 2.039
Zhejiang 8938 1.072 0.526
Anhui 6499 1.082 0.816
Fujian 5182 1.091 1.044
Jiangxi 4367 1.178 3.489
Shandong 17607 1.080 1.253
Henan 11090 1.076 0.808
Hubei 9403 1.124 2.821
Hunan 7072 1.052 -0.309
Guangdong 20607 1.166 6.825
Guangxi 4418 1.131 2.160
Chongqing 4010 1.022 -1.150
Sichuan 8763 1.098 1.644
Guizhou 3886 0.988 -2.201
Yunnan 4056 1.004 -1.729
Shaanxi 4365 1.060 -0.002
Gansu 3240 1.058 -0.042
Data source: China Census 10% sample (2000)
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Table 4.5: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase II
(1991-2010): Excluding High Sex Ratio Provinces
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure 0.038 0.021 -0.039 -0.059
(0.063) (0.062) (0.097) (0.101)
Firstborn daughter -0.306*** -0.304*** -0.111 -0.108
×OCP exposure (0.087) (0.085) (0.172) (0.180)
p-Value [0.003] [0.002] [0.527] [0.557]
Bootstrap p-Value [0.004] [0.004] [0.692] [0.784]
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.409 6.409 4.218 4.218
Std.Dev.DV 2.059 2.059 2.500 2.500
Observations 1,472 1,472 1,472 1,472
R-squared 0.105 0.119 0.091 0.103
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure in phase II is defined as the five-
year mean value of the fertility penalty rates in province p after individual i
had his/her first child. All regressions include a full set of province and co-
hort fixed effects. In parentheses are standard errors clustered by province.
Weuse awild cluster bootstrap-t procedure that are clustered at the province
level for improved inference with a small number of clusters (Cameron, Gel-
bachandMiller, 2008). We report the correspondingp-values inbrackets. We
also report the p-values for OLS with clustered data. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.6: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase II
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure (min) 0.077 0.068 -0.048 -0.058
(0.078) (0.074) (0.063) (0.066)
Firstborn daughter -0.220*** -0.216*** -0.017 -0.010
×OCP exposure (min) (0.073) (0.071) (0.122) (0.126)
Mean DV 6.407 6.407 4.304 4.304
Std.Dev.DV 2.065 2.065 2.470 2.470
Observations 1,897 1,897 1,897 1,897
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure is defined as theminimumof the
five-year fertility penalty rates in province p after individual i had his/her first
child. All regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In
parentheses are standard errors clustered by province. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.7: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase I
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure (min) 0.078 0.072 0.165** 0.151**
(0.068) (0.069) (0.059) (0.064)
Firstborn daughter -0.022 0.006 -0.227*** -0.212***
×OCP exposure (min) (0.100) (0.103) (0.053) (0.062)
Mean DV 6.582 6.582 4.957 4.957
Std.Dev.DV 2.072 2.072 2.502 2.502
Observations 822 822 822 822
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure is defined as the minimum
of the five-year family-planning rate in province p after an individual had
his/her first child. All regressions include a full set of province and co-
hort fixedeffects. Inparentheses are standard errors clusteredbyprovince.
Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.8: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase II
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure (4-year mean) 0.072 0.060 -0.009 -0.022
(0.062) (0.059) (0.080) (0.087)
Firstborn daughter -0.303*** -0.296*** -0.102 -0.100
×OCP exposure (4-year mean) (0.087) (0.087) (0.162) (0.170)
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.407 6.407 4.304 4.304
Std.Dev.DV 2.065 2.065 2.470 2.470
Observations 1,897 1,897 1,897 1,897
R-squared 0.089 0.098 0.078 0.088
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure is defined as the four-yearmean value of the
fertility penalty rates inprovincepafter individual i hadhis/herfirst child. All regressions
include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are standard errors
clustered by province. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.9: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase II
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure (6-year mean) 0.036 0.023 -0.076 -0.088
(0.069) (0.066) (0.074) (0.076)
Firstborn daughter -0.273*** -0.266*** -0.032 -0.033
×OCP exposure (6-year mean) (0.082) (0.083) (0.136) (0.141)
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.407 6.407 4.304 4.304
Std.Dev.DV 2.065 2.065 2.470 2.470
Observations 1,897 1,897 1,897 1,897
R-squared 0.088 0.097 0.078 0.088
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure is defined as the six-year mean value of the
fertility penalty rates inprovincepafter individual i hadhis/herfirst child. All regressions
include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are standard errors
clustered by province. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.10: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase I
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure (4-year mean) 0.075 0.064 0.088 0.082
(0.061) (0.060) (0.066) (0.059)
Firstborn daughter -0.065 -0.043 -0.250*** -0.248***
×OCP exposure (4-year mean) (0.072) (0.071) (0.060) (0.067)
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.582 6.582 4.957 4.957
Std.Dev.DV 2.072 2.072 2.502 2.502
Observations 822 822 822 822
R-squared 0.141 0.155 0.139 0.155
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure is defined as the four-year average
family-planning rate in province p after an urban resident had his/her first child. All
regressions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are
standard errors clustered by province. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.11: Estimates of OCP Exposure on Trust in Phase I
Dependent variable: Trust in
Neighbors Local governments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OCP exposure (6-year mean) 0.144 0.127 0.152 0.138
(0.111) (0.108) (0.117) (0.104)
Firstborn daughter -0.075 -0.037 -0.439*** -0.441***
×OCP exposure (6-year mean) (0.107) (0.104) (0.102) (0.110)
Individual controls Y Y
Cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Mean DV 6.582 6.582 4.957 4.957
Std.Dev.DV 2.072 2.072 2.502 2.502
Observations 822 822 822 822
R-squared 0.143 0.157 0.140 0.157
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OCP exposure is defined as the six-year average family-
planning rate in province p after an urban resident had his/her first child. All regres-
sions include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. In parentheses are stan-
dard errors clustered by province. We also report the p-values for OLS with clustered
data. Number of clusters: 25.
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Table 4.12: Distribution of Responses: Trust in Local
Governments
Trust in local governments
First child was a boy First child was a girl
0 9.87 9.73
1 6.65 5.42
2 8.86 9.85
3 10.57 12.94
4 5.94 5.53
5 29.81 31.97
6 9.77 8.41
7 7.25 5.75
8 7.05 6.42
9 2.01 2.32
10 2.22 1.66
Observations. 993 904
Mean DV 4.35 4.25
Std.Dev. DV 2.33 2.30
The table shows the distribution of responses to the question regard-
ing trust in local government officials, split by the gender of the first
child. Data source: CFPS (2016).
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Table 4.13: Correlation between Fertility
Penalty and Family-planning Rate
Dependent variable: Family-planning rate
Fertility penalty 1.588**
(0.659)
Province FE Y
Year FE Y
Observations 142
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors in
parentheses. The sample is a province-level panel
(unbalanced) from 1979 to 1987, when both fertility
penalty and family-planning rate are available.
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